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ABSTRACT
Syllogisms having conclusions consistent with 
atmosphere are shown to be accepted at significantly higher 
rates than those having conclusions inconsistent with 
atmosphere. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that the 
dual influences of quality and quantity, independently 
affect acceptance rates.
The first experiment also indicates a main effect of 
gender on acceptance rates to certain invalid syllogisms 
(those with conclusions inconsistent with quality, or 
quantity, or both). The second experiment replicates the 
atmosphere effect found in the first experiment and extends 
it to valid syllogisms and indeterminate invalids 
consistent with both quality and quantity. It also 
proposes an alternative to the misinterpreted necessity 
explanation for the logic by belief interaction. Both 
explanations are tested, and results indicate both are 
incomplete or incorrect. Evidence of a three way 
interaction of logic, belief, and consistency with 
atmosphere is reported.
The third experiment tests the effect of instructions 
on response patterns. Instructions stressing correct 
logical procedures for judging validity fail to 
significantly improve performance or affect mean belief 
bias for either valid or invalid syllogisms. This
viii
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experiment also indicates a main effect of gender on 
belief bias.
The theoretical justification for an influence of 
consistency with atmosphere is proposed, as well as a model 
of syllogistic reasoning, which acknowledges the 
simultaneous influences of logic, believability, and 
consistency with atmosphere.
ix
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The study of deductive reasoning has engaged 
psychologists for decades. Some believe that the greatest 
insight into cognitive processing is provided by 
identifying the conditions under which erroneous reasoning 
is likely to occur; others believe more is learned by
investigating the conditions that elicit pragmatically or 
logically "correct" inferences. But, to successfully 
formulate an accurate theory of deduction, both approaches 
are required.
A variety of logical tasks have been used in the 
laboratory to assess human reasoning abilities. This
dissertation is concerned with investigating deductive 
reasoning on syllogisms, which are deductive arguments 
consisting of two premises and one conclusion. While on 
the surface, all syllogisms appear to be rather elementary 
arguments, certain ones are surprisingly difficult. From a 
logical perspective, the inferences that may be correctly 
drawn from any two premises are specific and should be
independent of semantics. In reality, a large number of
errors are associated with this task. Much of the research 
on syllogistic reasoning has been directed at identifying 
the various factors that influence participants' 
performance, and the conditions under which these factors 
are most likely to operate.
1
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2Among researchers who study syllogistic reasoning, 
there is considerable agreement that performance is 
affected by both logical principles and by non-logical 
influences. (See Evans, 1989; Evans, Over, & Manktelow, 
1993; Politzer, 1990.) These non-logical influences 
include certain features of the particular syllogisms used, 
linguistic factors, attentional factors, and experience or 
world knowledge. (For a review of the effect of these 
pragmatic influences on deductive reasoning see Girotto and 
Politzer, 1990.) On the other hand, there is considerable 
disagreement concerning the degree to which specific non- 
logical influences are attributable to methodological 
artifacts.
There appear to be two major perspectives driving 
current research. One assumes that participants are 
primarily good deductive reasoners (Erickson, 1974; Henle, 
1962; Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; Wetherick, 1993). They 
first attempt to solve the syllogism using rules, Euler 
circles, mental models, or some other representation. If 
the conclusion they are presented with (in a judgment task) 
does not contradict the one generated by their particular 
reasoning method, they accept it. The non-logical
influence of belief is secondary; it affects which rules 
are applied, how the Euler circles are combined, or whether 
alternate mental models are constructed. The non-logical 
influence of atmosphere, discussed in detail below, is 
minimized or ignored, because it has been characterized as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
lacking theoretical underpinnings. Its effects are
believed to be an artifact of methodology. Atmosphere 
refers to an overall "mood" created by the two premises of 
a syllogism, which is related to their combined attributes 
of quality and quantity. This mood affects which 
conclusions participants are likely to accept. It is 
discussed in detail in Chapters 2 and 3.
The second major perspective denies the priority of 
reasoning. It assumes that most participants, rather than 
reasoning immediately, are first influenced by the 
believability of the conclusion. They reason only when 
that conclusion is false or unbelievable (Evans, Barston, & 
Pollard, 1983; Evans, 1989). Those few participants who 
do reason prior to being influenced by belief, do not fully 
understand the notion of necessity. They reject
conclusions that are falsified by the premises and reason 
about all others. If the conclusion is not contradicted by 
the premises, (i.e. it may be true, as opposed to must be 
true) , participants tend to accept it when it is 
believable, and reject it when it is not (Evans, Barston, & 
Pollard, 1983) . It is possible that the non-logical 
influence of atmosphere may be a disturbance variable that 
also affects responses (Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993). 
It can be controlled for by selecting particular syllogisms 
for study.
The experiments reported in this dissertation are 
grounded in a third perspective. It is similar to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4second, except that the non-logical influence of atmosphere 
is believed to operate in conjunction with believability, 
and perhaps with reasoning as well. Its effect is not 
believed to be a methodological artifact. Subjects are not 
characterized as failing to fully understand the notion of 
necessity; they are simply failing to override a generally 
successful default bias or heuristic that favors 
conclusions consistent with atmosphere.
Regardless of perspective, current research on 
syllogistic reasoning has focused, almost exclusively, on 
the dual influences of validity (often called "logic") and 
believability, and their interaction. The influence of 
atmosphere, while sometimes acknowledged, has essentially 
been ignored. In fact, no studies since the mid-1970s, 
have manipulated this factor as an independent variable.
This dissertation presents the results of three 
experiments designed to demonstrate that syllogisms having 
conclusions consistent with the atmosphere of the premises 
are accepted at significantly higher rates than those 
having conclusions inconsistent with this attribute. The 
experiments also investigated whether the frequently 
described logic by belief interaction could more accurately 
be characterized as a logic by belief by atmosphere 
interaction. Lastly, they examined whether the influence 
of atmosphere could be mitigated by an instruction 
manipulation.
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5Typically, the total number of syllogistic forms used 
in reasoning studies with thematic problems is quite small 
(participants are given 2-8 problems) , which brings into 
question the generalizability of results. The three 
experiments in this dissertation involve participants 
solving a minimum of 32 problems each.
With the exception of a recent study by Marilyn Ford 
(1994), few reasoning studies have examined gender 
differences in syllogistic reasoning, which the experiments 
in this dissertation will analyze. Ford indirectly 
addressed this issue using the method of protocol analysis. 
She identified two groups of participants: one which used
spatial representations resembling Euler circles; and one 
which used verbal representations. Any reader taking note 
of the participants' first names, could reasonable infer 
that it is predominantly the male participants (e.g. Steve, 
Richard) who reasoned spatially and predominately the 
females (e.g. Lisa, Beth) who reasoned linguistically. 
While Ford's study used only valid syllogisms, the 
experiments in this dissertation will directly examine 
gender differences in performance using both valid and 
invalid syllogisms.
This paper is structured in the following way:
Chapter 2 provides a description of the task to be 
used in these experiments, including the formal definition 
of a syllogism and the logical attributes associated with 
it.
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6Chapter 3 includes an historical overview of the
relevant literature, and a discussion of the major factors
identified as influencing participants' responses to both 
abstract and thematic syllogisms. It is argued that the 
effects of atmosphere have been minimized or masked in 
recent studies, because of the method by which the 
syllogisms (to be studied) are constructed and categorized.
Chapter 4 presents the materials, methods, results and 
discussion for Experiments 1, and 2.
Chapter 5 presents the materials, methods, results and 
discussion for Experiment 3.
Chapter 6 summarizes overall results and general
conclusions and provides recommendations for further
research.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE LOGICAL TASK
Logical Definition of Syllogism
A syllogism is a three statement argument consisting 
of two premises and a conclusion. A categorical syllogism 
is a special type of syllogism, where all three statements 
are standard form categorical propositions, which are 
statements that relate two classes or categories. All 
categorical syllogisms must contain a total of exactly 
three terms, where each term must be used exactly twice in 
distinct statements and only once in each statement.
A standard form categorical proposition relates the 
participant term to the predicate term by asserting that 
either all or part of the subject class is included in or 
is excluded from the predicate class. There are four types 
of standard form categorical propositions: All S are P -
designated an "A"; No S are P - designated an "E", Some S 
are P - designated an "I", and Some S are not P 
designated an "0".
Logical Attributes of Syllogisms 
Quality and Quantity
Quality and quantity are two attributes of categorical 
propositions. Quality (affirmative or negative) refers to 
whether the proposition is asserting that members of 
subject class are included in or excluded from the 
predicate class. The A and I statements are affirmative; E
7
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and O are negative. Quantity (universal or particular) 
refers to whether the proposition is asserting that all or 
some of the members of the subject class are included in 
the predicate class. A and E statements are universal; 0 
and I are particular. Thus, each type of statement (A, E, 
I, and 0) asserts a specific relationship holding between 
the subject and predicate classes: inclusion or exclusion 
of all or part of the former in, or from, the latter. 
Standard Form
A syllogism is said to be in standard form when all 
three premises are standard form categorical propositions, 
when there is no equivocation of terms, and when the major 
premise is listed first, the minor premise second, and the 
conclusion last. The major premise is the one containing 
the major term (the predicate of the conclusion); the minor 
premise contains the minor term (the subject of the 
conclusion). Two examples of standard form syllogisms are: 
a) All dogs are mammals. b) All D are M
Some dogs are snakes. Some D are S
No snakes are mammals No S are M
The first example, a), is referred to as a thematic 
syllogism; the second, b), is referred to as abstract.
Mood
After a syllogism has been put into standard form, the 
mood refers to the type of statements that make up the 
syllogism. The examples above have an A proposition as a 
major premise, an I proposition as a minor premise, and an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9E as a conclusion. Therefore, the mood of both arguments is 
AIE. Given that there are four kinds of categorical 
propositions and three categorical propositions in a 
syllogism, there are (43) sixty-four possible combinations 
of propositions, or moods.
Figure
The figure of a syllogism is determined by the
placement of the middle term (the term shared by both 
premises). It is an attribute of a categorical syllogism 
which has been put into standard form. A figure 1 has the 
middle term as the subject of the first premise and the 
predicate of the second premise. In a figure 2 standard 
form categorical syllogism, the middle terms are the 
predicates of each premise; in a figure 3, the middle terms 
are the subjects of each premise; and in a figure 4, the
middle term is the predicate of the first premise and
subject of the second premise.
To simplify the above information, one can represent 
the 4 figures in the following way (ignoring the 
quantifiers and copulas):
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4
M-P P-M M-P P-M
S-M S-M M-S M-S
M stands for middle term; S stands for the subject term of
the conclusion; P stands for the predicate term of the
conclusion. The example syllogisms, a) and b) shown above,
are both figure 3 syllogisms.
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Number of Syllogisms
With four possible figures for each of the 64 moods, 
there are two hundred and fifty six distinct categorical 
syllogisms (4*64).
Logical Validity
Syllogisms can be classified into two categories based 
on a logical attribute defined in formal deductive systems. 
They can be either valid or invalid. A valid syllogism is 
an argument where if the premises are assumed true, it is 
impossible for the conclusion to be false. That is, the 
conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. An 
invalid deductive syllogism is one where if the premises 
are assumed true, it is possible for the conclusion to be 
false. That is, the conclusion does not necessarily follow 
from the premises. The AIE-3 example syllogisms above are 
both invalid. Of the 256 possible categorical syllogisms, 
24 are valid and 232 are invalid.
Valid syllogisms can be further classified into two 
subcategories; unconditionally valid and conditionally 
valid. Unconditionally valid syllogisms are valid
regardless of whether the terms in the premises or 
conclusion denote things that actually exist, like dogs or 
trees. Conditionally valid syllogisms are those which are 
valid only if certain terms (subject, predicate, or middle) 
denote actually existing things, rather than unicorns or 
goblins. If the relevant term does not fulfill this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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condition, the syllogism is invalid. The 24 valid forms 
consist of 15 that are unconditionally valid, and 9 that 
are conditionally valid. All the valid syllogisms are 
shown in Table 1. It should be noted that the
conditionally valid syllogism forms investigated in 
Experiments 1-3 all used terms denoting existing things, so 
they could never be invalid.
Table 1. List of Valid Syllogisms (Designated by Mood) 
for Each Figure
Unconditionally valid
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4
AAA AEE IAI AEE
EAE EAE All IAI
All A00 0A0 EIO
EIO EIO EIO
Conditionally valid
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 If*





"If" refers to a requirement that the term shown mus
denote an actually existing thing, for the form to be 
valid. For example, an EAO-4 figure will be valid if M, the 
middle term, denotes a dog or cat; it will be invalid if 
it denotes a goblin or unicorn.
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CHAPTER 3
SUMMARY OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING RESEARCH
Factors Affecting Responses: From Research Using Abstract
Syllogisms
Prior to the 1980s, most researchers used syllogisms 
comprised of statements having abstract content (e.g. All S 
are P) . The emphasis has since shifted to using contextual 
syllogisms. The following factors were found to affect 
participants' responses to abstract syllogisms: (Refer to
Chapter 2 for an explanation of underlined terms.)
1. Subjects may be influenced by a conclusion's 
consistency with atmosphere, which is related to the 
quality and quantity of the premises. According to the 
psychological literature, these attributes (quality and 
quantity) collectively produce an "atmosphere" that induces 
a participant to either accept or reject a certain 
conclusion consistent with it. For example, when
participants are presented with a syllogism where both 
premises are "A" statements (e.g. All x are y) , most will 
accept a conclusion of type "A", regardless of validity, 
and reject other conclusions. This "atmosphere effect" has 
been found in almost every experiment past and present and 
will be discussed in detail later in this document. (See 
Begg & Denny, 1969; Dickstein, 1978a; Johnson-Laird & Bara, 
1984; Revlis, 1975; Sells, unpublished; Wilkins, 1928; 
Woodworth & Sells, 1935.)
12
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1 3
2 . Participants may be influenced by the figure of the 
syllogism. There is some evidence that difficulty in 
judging the validity of syllogisms increases from figures 1 
to 4. Figure has also been found to affect the conclusion 
that participants will generate, by influencing the 
position of the subject and predicate terms. (See 
Dickstein, 1978a; Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; Johnson-Laird 
Sc Steedman, 1978; Pezzoli & Frase, 1968.)
3. Subjects may be misinterpreting the premises in a way 
which results in their switching the subject and predicate 
terms. That is, participants might (mis)understand "All A 
are B" to mean "All B are A". This "illicit conversion" 
results in participants solving a different syllogism that 
the one they were given. (See Begg Sc Denny, 1969; Ceraso & 
Provitera, 1971; Chapman & Chapman, 1939; Dickstein, 1975, 
1978a Sc b; Revlis, 1975.)
4. Participants may be influenced by the actual logical 
status of the syllogism (logical validity). Subjects 
perform better when solving valid syllogisms as compared to 
solving invalid ones, the implication being that at least 
some participants are reasoning logically. (If perfect 
reasoning were universal, all valid conclusions would be 
accepted and all invalid ones would be rejected.) In the 
past, reasoning participants were thought to be applying 
formal rules, or drawing Euler circles. Recently, these 
means of representation have been rejected; participants
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 4
are now believed to be constructing mental models, as 
described by Johnson-Laird. (See Erickson, 1974; Johnson- 
Laird & Bara, 1984; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Johnson- 
Laird & Steedman, 1978.)
5. Participants may be influenced by the number of mental 
models (single or multiple) that must be constructed to 
represent and integrate the information provided by the 
premises. This factor, comes directly out of Johnson- 
Laird1 s mental model theory, so it can influence only those 
participants who are, in fact, reasoning as the theory 
describes. In other words, this factor is associated with 
a particular explanation of the influence of logical 
validity (factor 4). (For a detailed discussion of model 
theory, see Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984 and Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991). Proponents of model theory claim that the 
greater the number of different models that have to be 
constructed to draw a valid inference, the more difficult 
the syllogistic task will be.
Factors Affecting Responses: From Research Using Thematic
Syllogisms
From the mid 1980s on, syllogistic reasoning studies 
began to focus predominantly on thematic, rather than 
abstract, syllogisms (comprised of statements e.g. "All 
dogs are mammals") . This added a new dimension; each of 
the possible 256 syllogistic forms could have a conclusion 
that was either in accordance with or contrary to a 
participant's belief. The term "belief" refers either to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
one's attitude about an empirical statement or one's 
assessment of the truth (or falsity) of a statement of 
definition. An example of an empirical statement is "Some 
physicians collect stamps"; and an example of a 
definitional statement is "All dogs are mammals".
6. Perceived truth value, then, is the sixth factor 
found to influence participants' responses. More
specifically, participants may be influenced by the 
believability of the conclusion. They are more likely to 
accept a conclusion (as a valid inference) when it is in 
accordance with their beliefs and reject it (as invalid) 
when the conclusion is discordant with their beliefs, 
regardless of the logical validity of such an inference. 
This tendency is termed the belief bias effect. Empirical 
findings (Evans et al., 1983; Evans & Pollard, 1990; Janis 
& Frick, 1943; Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985; Oakhill et 
al., 1989; Wilkins, 1928) indicate a belief bias effect is 
evident both when participants generate a conclusion and 
when they evaluate one.
There is also robust evidence of an interaction 
between the influence of believability and logical 
validity. People seem to be more influenced by the truth 
value of the conclusion when they are reasoning about 
invalid syllogisms as opposed to valid ones. (Evans et al., 
1983; Markovits & Bouffard-Bouchard, 1992; Newstead & 
Evans, 1993; Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992; 
Oakhill Sc Garnham, 1993; Oakhill, Johnson-Laird, &
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Garnham, 1989). Evans et al. (1993) have described this
interaction from a slightly different perspective; the 
effects of validity appear to be stronger on syllogisms 
having unbelievable conclusions.
Recent research focuses primarily on the influences of 
validity and believability (factors 4 and 6) . As a result, 
three of the remaining four factors known to affect 
responses have been relegated to a minor role (factors 1, 2 
and 3) . The effects of the latter two, conversion and 
figure, are routinely controlled by limiting the tasks used 
in a study (i.e. by selecting particular subsets of valid 
or invalid syllogisms). Factor 5, as already mentioned, 
moderates the influence of logic (factor 4) within mental 
model theory, and has been the focus of study for years. 
The influence of atmosphere (factor 1) , however, has been 
unacknowledged or underestimated. It is the primary focus 
of this paper.
The experiments reported in this dissertation 
manipulated this factor as an independent variable, and 
provide evidence that it affects acceptance rates and 
belief bias for a large number of thematic syllogisms, both 
valid and invalid.
The focus on believability (factor 6) has resulted in 
researchers incorporating the belief bias effect into older 
processing models, or developing new models to explain it. 
There are currently four explanations for its source: 
illicit conversion; mental model representation; selective 
scrutiny; and misinterpreted necessity.
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Illicit Conversion and Belief Bias
Prior to the early-1980s, the believability of the 
premises was thought to affect the way participants 
interpreted the premises and, therefore, the subsequent 
inferences they would draw. The belief bias effect was 
thought to arise as a result of this tendency to illicitly 
convert premises. (Revlin & Leirer, 1978; Revlin, Leirer, 
Yopp & Yopp, 1980) . (See also Evans et al. , 1983; Evans &
Pollard, 1990; Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985; Oakhill et 
a l . , 1989; Wilkins, 1928.) The body evidence from these
experiments, however, shows there are belief bias effects 
even when conversion is blocked or when it makes no 
difference.
Mental Model Theory and Belief Bias
More recently, believability has been thought to 
affect the inferential reasoning process (Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991; Oakhill & Garnham, 1993; Oakhill, Garnham, 
Sc Johnson-Laird, 1990; Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985; 
Oakhill, Johnson-Laird, & Garnham, 1989) . This explanation 
has its underpinnings in mental model theory, which assumes 
that participants represent or model both premises of a 
syllogism using tokens for the subject and predicate terms. 
They then construct and integrate these models and draw a 
conclusion. There follows a search for an alternate model 
which will falsify the drawn conclusion, yet remain 
consistent with the premises. The theory's main prediction
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is that the greater the number of alternative models that 
must be constructed to arrive at a valid conclusion, the 
more difficult the task.
Under this interpretation, believability is thought to 
affect alternative model construction. If the first model 
constructed results in a conclusion which is both 
consistent with the premises and believable, the 
participant will tend to accept it and refrain from further 
processing. This theory makes two predictions. First, 
with single model syllogisms, there should be no belief 
bias effect as there are no alternative falsifying models. 
Second, with multi-model problems there should not only be 
an effect of belief, there should be more errors where the 
conclusion is believable or neutral. Results of studies 
testing these predictions are inconsistent. (See Oakhill & 
Johnson-Laird, 1985; Oakhill et a l ., 1989; and Newstead et 
al., 1993.)
Selective Scrutiny and Belief Bias
Finally, believability nas been thought to affect 
whether or not a participant will even engage in reasoning. 
Belief bias is understood simply as a response effect. 
That is, many participants are failing to reason at all; 
their responses are solely a function of the believability 
of the conclusion. (Evans, 1982; Evans, Barston, & 
Pollard, 1983; Evans & Pollard, 1990). Based on protocols, 
Evans et al. (1983) claimed that participants accept
believable conclusions for both valid and invalid
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 9
syllogisms, and only attempt to reason if the conclusion is 
unbelievable. This explanation is referred to as the 
selective scrutiny model. It is acknowledged that other 
factors besides belief are present in solving syllogisms, 
since many participants do indicate they are reasoning.
When faced with an unbelievable conclusion, after 
logical analysis, participants will correctly accept more 
valid conclusions than invalid ones. Thus, while this
model can explain the robust logic by belief interaction, 
it fails to explain why believable valid conclusions are 
more apt to be accepted than believable invalid 
conclusions. In other words, the account does not explain 
the effects of logic on believable conclusions.
Besides the protocol evidence, the model was supported 
by the finding by Evans & Pollard (1990) that increasing 
the complexity of multiple premise "syllogism-like" 
problems, did not increase the size of the belief bias
effect. This is consistent with the models prediction that 
believability exerts its influence prior to reasoning. 
Misinterpreted Necessity and Belief Bias
Evans also explains the logic by belief interaction in 
terms of another response effect. It is based on the 
claim that participants fail to fully understand the notion 
of necessity. When a conclusion simply may be true when 
the premises are true (rather than must be true) the
logically correct response is to state that nothing
follows; the syllogism is invalid. Instead, participants
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are likely to respond on the basis of their real world
knowledge; they tend to accept a conclusion that is
believable, rather than necessarily following from the 
premises. On the other hand, when a conclusion cannot 
possibly be true when the premises are true, it is clear 
that the syllogism is invalid, so there should be no effect 
of believability. As this likelihood of accepting 
conclusions which might be true occurs only for invalid
syllogisms, this model can provide an alternate explanation
for the logic by belief interaction.
The Influence of Atmosphere: Quantity and Quality of
Premises
Syllogisms can be classified into two categories based 
on how closely their conclusions match the one that 
participants would select if they were influenced by the 
atmosphere or "global impression" created by the premises. 
A conclusion is either consistent or inconsistent with that 
influence. The idea is that premises of a certain kind, 
either with regard to quality (affirmative or negative), or 
with regard to quantity (universal or particular), create a 
certain atmosphere, which then induces the participant to 
accept a conclusion having a similar atmosphere.
The original hypothesis, stated below (excluding 
parentheses), was proposed by Woodworth & Sells in 193 5 and 
restated by Begg & Denny (1969), as an explanation for the 
systematic errors that participants made on invalid, 
abstract syllogisms:
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a) (Regarding quality:) whenever there is a negative 
premise, there is a negative atmosphere. Otherwise, the 
atmosphere favors an affirmative conclusion.
b) (Regarding quantity:) whenever there is a
particular premise, i.e. containing the quantifier "some", 
there is a particular atmosphere. Otherwise, the
atmosphere favors universal conclusions.
Evidence For the Effect:
Two of the earliest studies documenting this effect 
were discussed in a paper by Woodworth & Sells (1935). 
Wilkins (1928) gave participants 8 "invalid" premise pairs 
and 3 conclusions (one of which was usually valid) for each 
pair. Subjects judged the validity or invalidity of each 
conclusion. For every premise pair, the percentage of 
acceptance of the conclusion indicated by atmosphere was 
always higher than the percentage not indicated. Sells 
(unpublished) replicated Wilkins' findings; he gave 
participants 300 premise pairs, and they judged whether a 
single conclusion was valid or invalid. Since responses 
selected by atmosphere are correlated with the traditional 
logical rules for determining validity or invalidity, 
reasoning in accordance with the effect should result in 
valid conclusions being accepted more readily than invalid 
ones (i.e. valid conclusions should be "easier" than 
invalids.) Sells found direct evidence supporting this: 
there were 16% errors for the 71 examples of valid 
syllogisms versus 40% errors for the 229 invalid ones.
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Most every study since has provided some evidence of 
this effect. For example, Begg & Denny (1969), using 
invalid premise pairs, found a pattern of errors consistent 
with the predictions of the atmosphere hypothesis.
Dickstein (1978a) reported that 49% of participants'
responses were consistent with those predicted by an 
atmosphere effect, where chance was 20%. Johnson-Laird & 
Bara's (1984) data, based on participants generating 
conclusions to 64 premise pairs, showed 43% responses 
consistent with atmosphere.
Evidence Against the Effect:
Some researchers claim that empirical evidence
indicates the atmosphere effect may be weak. For example, 
Dickstein (1978a & b) found that participants frequently 
respond there is no valid conclusion, even though there is 
always some conclusion corresponding to the atmosphere of 
any two premises. Johnson-Laird & Steedman (1978), using a 
generation task, found a majority of participants responded 
there was no valid conclusion to a premise pair even though 
it did have a valid conclusion consistent with atmosphere 
predictions. (If atmosphere strongly determined
participants responses, they would rarely respond "no valid 
conclusion".) Wason & Johnson-Laird (1972) reported the
findings of a pilot study by Johnson-Laird which used only 
premise pairs that could lead to a valid conclusion in 
certain figures. There were more erroneous responses
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 3
incompatible with atmosphere, than there were compatible 
with atmosphere (3.9% vs. 1.8%). They did not report 
whether this difference was significant. It is also 
interesting to note that while there were more correct 
responses compatible with atmosphere, good performance was 
attributed to good reasoning rather than to the influence 
of this non-logical bias.
This same paper found that any tendency to be 
influenced by atmosphere varied with particular syllogisms. 
All and AEO problems tended to elicit errors consistent 
with atmosphere, while IEO and A00 problems did not. (The 
syllogisms with 0 conclusions resulted in the most errors, 
overall.) Wason & Johnson-Laird (1972), while not
acknowledging any influence of atmosphere, did concede that 
even if there were one, it could, at best, provide only a 
partial explanation of results. When participants are 
given the premises "All B are A" and "All C are B", 
atmosphere predicts an A conclusion, but does not predict a 
preference for either "All C are A" or "All A are C " . They 
referred to Sell's (unpublished) results, which found that 
the former, which is the logically valid conclusion, was 
accepted by 94% of participants, while the latter was 
accepted by only 45%.
Summary
While it is clear that atmosphere is not the sole 
determinate of participants' responses, there is extensive 
evidence that its effects are present in most every study
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using abstract syllogisms, even those which failed to take 
them into account. Still, they are often dismissed by 
researchers as being an artifact of methodology, either of 
problem type or instructions.
This dissertation rests on the belief that there is 
ample evidence of atmosphere effects, which should not be 
discounted. Three experiments will investigate atmosphere 
effects in a judgment task using thematic syllogisms.
These experiments will test the hypothesis that responses 
to thematic syllogisms are affected by the quality and 
quantity of the premises, as well as by the believability 
of the conclusion and its logical status (valid or
invalid).
New Notation
Early experimenters who did investigate atmosphere
effects identified whether or not participants' responses
were consistent or inconsistent with the cumulative 
influence of quality and quantity. However, in order to 
fully understand the experiments and appreciate the 
problems arising from recently popularized nomenclature, it 
is necessary to use an additional notation designating 
whether responses are consistent or inconsistent with the 
individual influence of quality and quantity.
Syllogisms having a conclusion in accordance with both 
a) and b) of the original atmosphere "hypothesis" are 
classified as CBoth, consistent with both quality and 
quantity. This includes both valid and invalid problems.
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Syllogisms having a conclusion that is in accordance 
with quality but not quantity, are denoted Cql. These 
include both valid and invalid forms.
Syllogisms having a conclusion that is in accordance 
with quantity but not quality are denoted Cqn. These 
include only invalid forms.
Finally, syllogisms not in accordance with either 
quality or quantity are classified as CNone. These include 
only invalid forms.
To summarize, there are four types of consistency 
classifications: CBoth; Cql; Cqn; and CNone. All valids
are either CBoth or Cql syllogisms. Invalid syllogisms, 
have also been subdivided into 2 categories, indeterminate 
and determinately false (discussed below). Indeterminate 
invalids may have a conclusion which is CBoth, Cql, Cqn, or 
CNone,- determinately false invalids may have a conclusion 
which is Cqn or CNone. It is unclear whether participants 
presented with different sub-categories of invalid problems 
will respond in the same way. This has not yet been 
determined experimentally. If syllogisms of varying 
consistency types differentially affect participants' 
conclusion acceptance rates, then results of studies using 
only one type of indeterminate or determinately false 
syllogism may not be generalizable.
Study by Newstead, Pollard, Evans, and Allen (1992)
Results reported in a recent study by Newstead e t . al 
(1992) suggest that methodological considerations may
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result in atmosphere effects being reduced. Newstead et 
al. ran 5 experiments to test the predictions of three 
models concerning the effect of belief and the logic by 
belief interaction: mental models, selective scrutiny, and 
misinterpreted necessity.
Before discussing their findings, it is necessary to 
discuss their nomenclature (also in Oakhill et al., 1989), 
which classifies syllogisms into 2 categories: 
"determinate", which designates valid and certain invalid 
syllogisms, and "indeterminate", which designates all other 
invalid syllogisms. "Determinately true" refers to valid 
syllogisms; "determinately false", refers to invalid 
syllogisms that have a conclusion that must be false (it is 
falsified by the premises). Logically, this occurs only 
when the conclusion is a statement which is contradictory 
to the valid conclusion that would follow from the given 
premises. Since there are 24 valid syllogisms, there are 
24 determinately false syllogisms; 9 are type 3 (Cqn); 15 
are type 4 (CNone) . The remaining invalids are
indeterminate.
Based on their terminology, all valid syllogisms are 
determinate, while invalid syllogisms are either 
determinately false or indeterminate. This dissertation 
will argue that an explanation of belief effects and the 
logic by belief interaction in these terms may be 
incomplete.
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Summary of Findings: Experiments 1-5
The combined results of the 5 experiments appeared to 
be contrary to the selective scrutiny explanation of belief 
bias (which assumes the bias operates prior to reasoning). 
They provided some evidence in favor of, and some evidence 
contrary to, both the misinterpreted necessity account of 
belief bias and (a modified version of) the mental model 
explanation. More relevant to this dissertation, however, 
is the fact that the logic by belief interaction was found 
to disappear when participants were given determinately 
false invalid syllogisms and (single model) valid 
syllogisms. It reappeared when participants were given 
indeterminate invalid syllogisms and (multiple model) valid 
syllogisms. It is important, however, to point out that 
only 9 different syllogistic forms were used across the 5 
experiments. These are shown on Table 2.
Relationship of Determinancy to Consistency with Atmosphere 
A strong argument can be made that categorizing 
invalids as determinately false and indeterminate is 
problematic, as these two categories are not mutually 
exclusive with regard to the attribute of consistency with 
atmosphere. It is possible that the Newstead et a l . 
findings were the result of differences in consistency, 
rather than determinancy.
In their series of 5 experiments, the conclusion 
acceptance rates of multiple model valid syllogisms were
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always compared to those of indeterminate invalid 
syllogisms, and a logic by belief interaction was found. 
These particular invalid problems were formed by keeping 
the same premises as the valid syllogism, while switching 
the terms of the valid conclusion. As a result, the 
invalids were always consistent with quality and quantity 
and indeterminate, i.e. CBoth-IND.
Table 2. Syllogisms Used by Newstead et al. (1992)
CBoth-V CBoth-IND-I Cql-V Cqn-DF-I
EAE-1 SM IEO-1 AAE-1
AAA-1 SM AAA-4 EAA-1
EIO-1 MM IEO-2
EIO-2 MM
Note. Syllogisms are identified in this table by mood and 
figure, according to logical convention. The letters 
following the syllogism's figure refer to the number of 
mental models required to draw a valid conclusion, 
according to mental model theory. SM=single model
syllogism; MM=multiple model syllogism. Syllogisms are 
listed in 4 categories: CBoth-V=valid conclusion is
consistent with quality and quantity; CBoth-IND- 
I=indeterminate invalid conclusion is consistent with 
quality and quantity; Cql-V=valid conclusion is consistent 
with quality, but inconsistent with quantity; Cqn-DF- 
I=determinately false invalid conclusion is inconsistent 
with quality, but consistent with quantity. All forms had 
both true and false versions.
Only three distinct forms of indeterminates were 
investigated, IEO-1, IEO-2, and AAA-4. All multiple model 
valids were consistent with atmosphere (CBoth). [Responses 
to multiple model valids were not compared to determinately 
false invalids, in this study.]
When single model valids (also CBoth) were compared to 
determinately false invalids, the logic by belief
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interaction disappeared. Again, all the invalid problems 
had the same premises as the valid forms, but had the 
contrary conclusion. For example, if the valid syllogism 
(AAA-1) had the conclusion "All sparrows are birds", the 
invalid version (AAE-1) had the conclusion "No sparrows are 
birds". Thus, invalids were always inconsistent with 
atmosphere quality, Cqn. Only two distinct forms of 
determinately false syllogisms were used in these five 
experiments, AAE-1 and EAA-1.
When single model valids were compared to 
indeterminate invalids, the invalids were formed by 
switching the terms of the valid conclusion, so again were 
all CBoth.
Therefore, these experiments involved only CBoth valid 
problems, both single and multiple model, CBoth 
indeterminate invalid problems, and determinately false 
invalid problems that were inconsistent with quality, but 
consistent with quantity. The logic by belief interaction 
was present when responses to indeterminate invalid 
problems were compared to valids, and it disappeared when 
determinately false invalids were compared to valids. (The 
methods used to generate the particular invalid forms in 
each experiment were probably the result of efforts to 
control for the effects of atmosphere and/or conversion.)
The problem is, from the prospective of logic, 
determinately false invalid problems do not have to be Cqn;
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they can also be CNone. Likewise, indeterminate invalid 
problems do not have to be consistent, CBoth; they can be 
inconsistent with quantity, Cql, inconsistent with quality, 
Cqn, or inconsistent with both, CNone. So, before results 
based on the categorization of syllogisms as indeterminate 
and determinately false can be generalized, it must be 
demonstrated that all indeterminate invalid syllogisms 
result in a logic by belief interaction and elicit similar 
conclusion acceptance rates. Likewise, it must be shown 
that CNone determinately false syllogisms elicit the same 
response patterns as Cqn. To summarize, it is hypothesized 
that it was the attribute of consistency, not determinancy, 
that influenced participants1 responses in this Newstead et 
al study.
It is possible to sub-categorize valid syllogisms 
according to 4 features: mood and figure; determinancy;
consistency; or the number of mental models required. 
Invalids can be sub-categorized by mood and figure, 
determinancy or consistency. Figure 1 shows the
relationship between sub-categories of valid and invalid 
syllogisms categorized by these different features.
Although syllogisms described as determinately false 
invalids might elicit the same responses as syllogisms 
described as having conclusions inconsistent with 
atmosphere effects; and although certain indeterminate 
invalids might elicit the same responses as those 
characterized as having conclusions consistent with
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atmosphere, it is important to emphasize that this is more 
than a mere verbal dispute. It is an epistemological 
dispute of some consequence. Subjects can only detect and 
be influenced by "determinancy" as a result of applying 
logical principles; the influence of atmosphere is 
conjectured to be an a-logical bias or heuristic.
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CATEGORIZATION OF VALID AND INVALID SYLLOGISMS
According to Logic 
Valid & Invalid Categorized By Mood and Figure
Valids Sub-categorized as Unconditional or Conditional
According to Determinancy 
(Used In Mental Model Theory 







According to Consistency with Atmosphere 







CBoth Cql Cqn CNone Cqn CNone
Figure 1. The relationship between sub-categories of valid 
and invalid syllogisms categorized by different features.
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENT 1 AND EXPERIMENT 2
The first two experiments were designed to investigate 
the factors that influence participants' willingness to 
accept the conclusions to thematic syllogisms. The major 
hypothesis tested was whether a conclusion's consistency 
with atmosphere was predictive of participants' responses, 
in addition to its believability and/or logical validity. 
Experiments 1 & 2 tested this hypothesis by examining
response rates to true and false versions of consistent 
(valid and invalid) and inconsistent (valid and invalid) 
syllogisms.
Experiment 1 used only invalid syllogisms inconsistent 
with quality, quantity, or both. It did not include CBoth 
invalids. It investigated whether atmosphere effects were 
evident for these IND and DF syllogisms, and whether 
certain forms elicited significantly different acceptance 
rates and/or belief bias. The main reason for looking at 
these particular invalid forms was to determine, which 
syllogisms, besides CBoth invalids, were to be included in 
the second experiment: IND Cql, IND Cqn, IND CNone, DF Cqn 
or DF CNone.
Experiment 2 extended the investigation of the 
influence of atmosphere to include CBoth and Cql valid, and 
CBoth IND invalid syllogisms. It also re-examined the 
frequently reported interaction between logic and belief.
33
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As previously noted, Newstead et al. (1992) found that the 
interaction was present when IND invalids were compared to 
valids and disappeared only when DF invalids were used. 
This dissertation claims the results are problematic 
insofar as the experiments confounded consistency with
atmosphere and determinancy. To reiterate, their 5 
experiments used only CBoth indeterminate (IND) invalid
problems and only Cqn determinately false (DF) invalid 
problems. Their explanation of the logic by belief 
interaction in terms of determinancy would require
revision, if consistency with atmosphere affected this 
interaction.
Experiment 2 tested an alternative hypothesis to that 
of Newstead et al. (1992), that the logic by belief
interaction occurs when invalid syllogisms have conclusions 
consistent with atmosphere, i.e. with CBoth IND forms; it 
disappears when the invalids have conclusions inconsistent 
with atmosphere, i.e. with other invalid forms. Results of 
Experiment 1 determined which particular types of 
inconsistent invalid forms were included in this second 
experiment. In addition to the main hypotheses,
Experiments 1 and 2 examined the effect of gender on both 
acceptance rates and belief bias.
Findings from these two experiments were expected to 
be more generalizable than those of most others, as many 
more syllogisms were used and their particular forms were 
not constrained by other considerations. Because the
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influence of atmosphere was treated as an independent
variable, there were no limitations on which valid or
invalid forms could be investigated. In other words, it
was possible to determine conclusion acceptance rates for 
invalid forms that were unrelated to the valid forms to
which they were compared.
Notation
Experiment 1 (and Experiments 2 Sc 3) used the notation 
presented in Chapter 3, which designated four ways in which 
a conclusion could accord with atmosphere predictions. To 
reiterate, the four consistency classifications were based 
on whether it was quality and/or quantity of the conclusion 
that was in accordance with the combined atmosphere of 
the premises. CBoth syllogisms were consistent with both 
quality and quantity; Cql were consistent with quality 
only; Cqn were consistent with quantity only; and CNone 
were consistent with neither.
In addition, valid syllogisms were denoted as "V" and 
invalids denoted as "I", with invalids also tagged either 
as "DF" or "IND" to indicate the differentiation recently 
drawn between determinately false and indeterminate invalid 
forms. Syllogisms having a true conclusion were denoted 
"T", and those having a false conclusion, "F". So, a 
syllogism designated as IND Cql-T referred to an 
indeterminate (invalid) problem, having a conclusion 
consistent with atmosphere's predictions regarding quality 
(but not quantity), which was true.
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Experiment 1
Before Experiment 2 investigated the relationship of 
consistency, belief, and logic to participants' responses 
to valid and invalid syllogisms, Experiment 1 examined 
response rates to all invalid forms that were not CBoth; 
they were consistent with either quality, quantity, or 
neither. In particular, it was to determine two things.- 
first, whether the categorization of invalid syllogisms by 
the feature of determinancy is warranted; and second, 
whether sub-categorizing these problems by consistency type 
is warranted (i.e. whether Cql, Cqn and CNone problems 
elicit similar conclusion acceptance rates and/or belief 
bias effects). The result of these determinations dictated 
which invalid problems (besides CBoth IND) were included in 
Experiment 2.
With regard to the first determination: if acceptance 
rates and belief bias to DF vs. IND problems of the same 
type (e.g. Cqn or CNone) did not significantly differ, this 
indicated that determinancy was not the critical factor 
which predicted responses to invalid syllogisms; it was 
more likely consistency type. If, on the other hand, 
either acceptance rates or belief bias to these problems 
did significantly differ, this indicated the legitimacy of 
categorizing on the basis of determinancy. And, while this 
finding would not directly bear on the main hypothesis, 
that response patterns for syllogisms consistent with
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atmosphere (both quantity and quality) differ significantly 
from those for syllogisms inconsistent with atmosphere 
(either quantity, quality, or both), it could complicate 
the issue. Experiment 2 would have to investigate both DF 
and IND syllogisms with inconsistent conclusions.
With regard to the second determination: if acceptance 
rates and belief bias among Cql, Cqn and CNone IND and 
between Cqn and CNone DF invalids did not significantly 
differ, there was no need to sub-categorize on the basis 
of consistency type: the inconsistent (non-CBoth) invalid
problems used in Experiment 2 could be of any type. On the 
other hand, if they did significantly differ, this could 
indicate atmosphere's influence had two component parts, 
consistency with quality and consistency with quality, 
which might differentially affect responses. Again, this 
result meant Experiment 2 had to investigate multiple types 
of inconsistent invalid problems.
Since these experiments were breaking new ground, it 
was unclear whether to expect significant differences in 
acceptance rates or belief bias among Cql, Cqn and CNone 
IND problems or between Cqn and CNone DF problems. That 
said, it would not have been surprising if Cql IND problems 
were unique, as they were the only inconsistent type which 
had conclusions consistent with atmosphere predictions of 
quality (i.e. they were inconsistent only with regard to 
quantity).
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Subjects. Seventy undergraduates from Louisiana State 
University, voluntarily participated in this experiment. 
All were enrolled in introductory level philosophy courses, 
and all were over 18 years of age. The population of these 
classes represented a wide range of college majors, and 
ethnic and racial backgrounds. There were approximately 
equal numbers of males and females, 32 and 3 8 respectively. 
None had any previous instruction in logic.
Prior to the experiment, participants were given a 
consent form, which they read and were required to sign. 
This explained the purpose of the study and procedure, as 
well as their rights as volunteers (including the right to 
confidentiality and right to withdraw).
Materials and Procedure. Thirty-eight syllogisms were used 
in this experiment, 8 valid syllogisms and 3 0 invalid. The 
valids were all Cql; 2 forms were of figure 2 (EAO & AEO) 
and 2 were of figure 3 (AAI & EAO) . Each form had a true 
and false version. These valid syllogisms were used as 
fillers, and were not included in the statistical analysis.
There were 5 inconsistent invalid problem types: IND
Cql; IND Cqn; IND CNone; DF Cqn; and DF CNone. Every 
problem type consisted of 3 syllogistic forms, one each of 
figures 2, 3, and 4. All forms had both true and false
versions, which was a reference to the truth value of the 
conclusion. It was decided that content would be true or 
false by definition, so common classifications of the 
animal kingdom were used. Examples of true conclusions used 
in the experiment are "Some mammals are not dogs", "No
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poodles are insects", and "All robins are birds". Examples 
of false conclusions are "All mammals are insects", "Some 
dogs are cats", and "No dogs are animals".
All syllogisms, regardless of the truth value of the 
conclusion, had one true premise and one false one. This 
was done because determinately false (DF) syllogisms, by 
definition, cannot have a true conclusion when both 
premises are true. It was decided to similarly constrain 
both true and false versions of DF and IND problems, as 
this would also balance belief effects arising in the 
premises.
It was necessary to limit the total number of 
syllogisms used in the experiment, so participants would be 
more likely to complete the task. As a result, figure 1 
forms, normally considered easier, were not included.
Within a given consistency type, the DF and IND forms 
selected were similar with regard to the categorical 
statements of which they were comprised (A, E, I, or 0) . 
This was done so differences in DF versus IND response 
rates could not reasonably be attributed to the use of 
particular statements. Table 3 shows the syllogistic forms 
used in Experiment 1.
Participants were given a booklet including a page of 
instructions and the 3 8 problems in random order. Each 
problem was presented on a single page, and participants 
were verbally instructed to work the problems in order 
without reviewing previous answers. They were given the
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following instructions, which are similar to those used by 
Evans et al. (1983) and Newstead et al. (1992): "On each of
the following pages, you will find a reasoning problem, 
consisting of two statements and a conclusion shown below 
the statements. Your task is to indicate if the conclusion 
necessarily follows from the two statements, assuming that 
these statements are, in fact, true. If you judge that the 
conclusion can logically be deduced from the statements, 
you should answer "yes", otherwise "no". Please circle the 
appropriate word (yes or no) given below the problem. 
Please take your time and be sure that you have the right 
answer before doing so." Participants were allowed as much 
time as they needed to finish all problems: everyone
finished within 4 0 minutes.
Table 3. Experiment 1: Invalid Syllogisms Used
Indeterminate Determinately False
Cql Cqn CNone Cqn CNone
AAI-2 AAE-2 IAE-2 EAA-2 AEI-2
AEO-3 AEA-3 AAO-3 AAE-3 OAA-3
IOE-4 EEA-4 AOA-4 AEA-4 IAE-4
Note. There was a true and false version of each form.
Results and Discussion Three participants did not complete 
every problem and were excluded from the analysis, leaving 
31 male and 36 female participants.
Prior to the analysis, a correlation matrix was run to 
ensure that participants' responses were indeed correlated,
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thus confirming the appropriateness of running a repeated 
measures analysis. A correlation was found and confirmed 
by the subsequent SAS analysis, which tests the assumption 
of equal variances and correlations in t-tests or ANOVA 
using the Greenhouse-Geisser-Epsilon and Huynh-Feldt- 
Epsilon statistics. As both were non-significant, the 
analysis proceeded as a repeated measures ANOVA. Table 4 
shows the mean percentage of conclusions accepted for each
problem type, both by gender and pooled over gender.
Table 4. Experiment 1: Mean Percentage Conclusions Accepted
Problem Truth Female Male Female+Male
Type Value (n=36) (n=31) (n=67)
IND
Cql True 57 54 55
False 54 32 44
Total 56 43 50 a
Cqn True 17 10 14
False 8 5 7
Total 13 8 i:Lc
CNone True 20 24 22
False 15 10 12
Total 18 17 17BDF
Cqn True 4 2 3
False 2 1 2
Total 3 2 2 d
CNone True 7 2 5
False 7 4 5
Total 7 3
Note. The row labeled "Total" refers to acceptance rates
for each invalid problem type, pooled over truth value. 
Means with different subscripts differ significantly at 
p< .005 in multiple t-tests using the Bonferroni
correction.
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Performance was first assessed using mean percentage 
lconclusion acceptance rates as the measure. Only
responses to the invalid syllogisms were of interest. Data
were analyzed by a three factor mixed design ANOVA, with 
repeated measures on two factors. The within factors were 
problem type (five levels) and truth value or believability 
(two levels), and the between factor was gender (two
levels). These data were also analyzed using logistic 
regression, a form of statistical modeling through odds 
ratios, appropriate for categorical outcome variables. The 
two methods of analysis yielded comparable results. ANOVA 
may not be ideal for use on categorical variables, but, as 
it is acceptable for making global analyses based on 
proportions, it was the statistical method of choice for
subsequent analyses.
This experiment was primarily concerned with 
determining whether acceptance rates and/or belief bias 
differed among the different types of invalid problems, so 
responses were pooled over gender and analyzed. The 
analysis did reveal a significant main effect of problem 
type on acceptance rates, F (4,260)=122.52, p<.0001, shown 
in Figure 2. To test whether the distinction between IND 
and DF syllogisms was appropriate, post-hoc multiple t- 
tests using the Bonferroni correction were run. As this is 
a conservative correction for maintaining the 
experimentalwise level of significance at .05, a stepwise 
correction to the comparisonwise error rate was also used.




























Figure 2. Experiment 1. Mean percentage acceptance rates 
for invalid syllogisms, collapsed 
over gender and truth value. n=67.
IND IND IND DF DF
Cql Cqn CNone Cqn CNone
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The mean acceptance rate of IND syllogisms was 
significantly higher than that of DF syllogisms, 
t (66)=16.58, p<.001, by both methods of correction.
In addition, the means of Cqn IND vs. Cqn DF and CNone 
IND vs. CNone DF syllogisms were compared. There was a 
significant difference in the acceptance rates of Cqn 
syllogisms; 11% vs. 2%, t(66)=5.03, p<.001, as well as in
acceptance rates of CNone; 17% vs. 5%, t (66)=6.76, £<.001. 
The percentage of DF conclusions accepted ranged from 2-7%, 
while as many as 55% of IND conclusions were accepted. So, 
categorizing by the feature of determinancy did appear to 
be meaningful, with regard to acceptance rates. Further 
evidence of this came from comparing the IND problem type 
having the lowest mean acceptance rate (Cqn, 11%) to the DF 
problem type having the highest rate (CNone, 5%) . Again, 
they were significantly different, t (66)=3.47, £<.001.
These differences in acceptance rates, between IND and 
DF syllogisms of the same consistency type, suggested that 
participants were being influenced by logic. Most
participants were correctly rejecting conclusions to DF 
forms, yet continued to incorrectly accept conclusions to 
IND forms. Apparently, they were able to distinguish 
between conclusions that had no possibility of following 
from premises, from conclusions that might have some 
possibility of following. In other words, it did not 
appear that participants failed to understand the notion of
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necessity. Some just failed to utilize it when responding 
to IND problems. The possibility that a conclusion might 
follow from the premises was sufficient to induce some 
participants to refrain from rejecting it.
When the 3 types of IND syllogisms were compared, 
results indicated that Cql acceptance rates (50%) were 
significantly higher than both Cqn (11%), t(66)=ll.53,
£<.001, and CNone (17%), t (66)=9.95, £<.001. CNone IND
acceptance rates were significantly higher than Cqn, 
t.(66)=-3.06, £<.005. Although it is unclear why more CNone 
IND problems were accepted than Cqn, what is clear is that 
the dual components of atmosphere, quality and quantity, 
independently affected acceptance rates to IND syllogisms. 
As a result, all 3 types of inconsistent IND syllogisms 
were to be included in Experiment 2.
The acceptance rates of the Cqn and CNone DF 
syllogisms did not significantly differ (2% vs. 5%, 
respectively). Therefore, it was not necessary to include 
both types of DF syllogisms in Experiment 2.
Results also showed a significant main effect of truth 
value F (1,65)=23.31, £<.0001. Acceptance rates of
syllogisms having true conclusions were significantly 
higher than those having false conclusions. There was also 
an interaction of truth value with problem type, 
F (4,260)=3.78,£<.01, as well as a 3-way interaction of 
truth value, problem type, and gender, F (4,260)=2.84,£<.05. 
Both interactions will be discussed below.
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Data analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
gender, F (1,65)=4.51, £<.05, with females accepting
significantly more conclusions than males, 19% vs. 14% 
respectively. This was not really expected, as no studies 
in the literature have reported gender differences in 
solving invalid syllogisms. However, this finding was 
consistent with Ford's study (1994), which used only 
abstract valid syllogisms. She identified two modes of 
reasoning that appeared to be associated with gender. The 
group consisting of mostly females used a verbal 
representation, while the group including mostly males used 
a spatial one. Ford found that these different strategies 
resulted in a different pattern of correct responses. 
While an interaction of gender with problem type was not 
detected in this experiment, gender did enter into a 3-way 
interaction with problem type and truth value.
To clarify this and the interaction between problem 
type and truth value, the data were re-analyzed using 
belief bias as the dependent variable, where belief bias 
refers to the difference in mean acceptance rates between 
the true and false versions of a given problem type. An 
interaction of truth value with problem type can be 
detected by noting that lines connecting cell means of true 
vs. false problems are not parallel. Therefore, examining 
where there are significant differences in belief bias 
among problem types and between genders clarified the
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nature of these interactions. Figure 3 and Table 5 show 
the mean percent belief bias for each problem type by 
gender. Table 5 also shows belief bias pooled over gender.
Table 5. Experiment 1: Mean Percentage Belief Bias by
Gender, and Pooled Over Gender
Problem Female Male Female+Ma
Type (n=36) (n=31)
IND Cql 3.6 21.5 11.8.




IND CNone 5.6 14 . 0
DF Cqn 2 . 7 1.1
DF CNone 0.9 -2 . 2
ALL 4.3 7 . 7 5 . 9
Note. Means with different subscripts differ significantly 
at p<.005 in multiple t-tests using the Bonferroni 
correction.
The three way interaction between problem type, truth 
value and gender, F (4,260)=2.84,p < .05, was a result of 
there being a significant difference in average belief bias 
for IND vs. DF syllogisms for males, t(30)=5.68. pc.001,
but not for females. This resulted from gender differences 
in belief bias when responding to Cql IND problems (see 
Tables 5 & 6). While both males and females accepted a 
majority of the conclusions to the true versions of these 
Cql IND problems, (54% vs. 57% respectively), they differed 
in their acceptance of false versions (32% vs. 54%). Only 
males had belief bias significantly different than zero for 
these problems (21.5%), (t (30) =3.93, joc.OOl, while females 
were unaffected by belief (3.6%) . Outside of these
























Figure 3. Experiment 1. Mean percentage belief bias 
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problems, belief bias for males and females did not differ 
significantly, i.e. both genders were similarly affected by 
the believability of the conclusion.
The interaction between problem type and truth value 
(collapsed over gender) was analyzed using multiple t-tests 
with the Bonferroni correction and with a stepwise 
correction. These analyses indicated that the average 
belief bias elicited by IND syllogisms was significantly 
higher than that elicited by DF syllogisms, t(66)=4.12,
E < . 001. This was attributed to the fact that IND Cql 
problems elicited significantly more belief bias compared 
to DF CNone syllogism, t (66)=3.21, p<.05. Aside from this 
comparison, no other invalid problem types differed 
significantly with regard to belief bias. Belief bias for 
Cqn IND vs. Cqn DF and CNone IND vs. CNone DF syllogisms 
did not significantly differ, and there were no significant 
differences in belief bias among Cql, Cqn, and CNone IND 
syllogisms or between Cqn and CNone DF syllogisms.
It is tempting to conclude that the genders may be 
differentially affected by non-logical biases when faced 
with Cql IND syllogisms. If this were true, then a gender 
difference would also be evident when participants solved 
CBoth IND syllogisms. It remained to be seen whether 
Experiment 2, which included Cql IND and CBoth IND 
problems, would replicate this finding. Again, a claim of 
gender related biases would be consistent with Ford's 
(1994) finding of two different modes of generating 
conclusions to abstract valid syllogisms.
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One more result is worthy of mention. There appeared 
to be two "odd" syllogisms among the 30 used in Experiment 
1. All of the syllogisms within a given problem type 
elicited similar acceptance rates and belief bias, with two 
exceptions. One Cql IND problem, IOE-4, and one CNone DF 
problem, IAE-4, elicited negative belief bias. It is 
unclear what made these particular problems unique. It 
could have something to do either with their having an E 
statement as a conclusion, or their both being figure 4
syllogisms with an E conclusion. If these problems had 
been omitted from the analysis, the Cql IND problems would 
have elicited 20.7% belief bias vs. the 11% reported, which 
would have been significantly higher than any other IND 
invalid form. This would have more strongly suggested that 
problems consistent with quality are fundamentally 
different from other IND problems. Mean belief bias for 
the CNone DF problems would have been 2.5%, which would not 
have significantly differed from the -.4% reported.
An interesting picture emerged from these overall 
findings, keeping in mind that all of these syllogisms
would be rejected, if participants actually reasoned in 
accordance with logic. One non-logical attribute of a 
syllogism (that of having a conclusion inconsistent with
quality and/or quantity) appeared to differentially affect 
a participant's willingness to accept a conclusion. Yet, 
when participants solved these IND or DF problems, the 
influence of a second non-logical attribute, the
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believability of the conclusion, was relatively uniform 
(with the exception of Cql IND problems, which may act more 
like CBoth-IND problems). In other words, regardless of 
the rate at which they were willing to accept a conclusion 
to an inconsistent invalid problem (Cqn or CNone, IND or 
DF) , the effect of truth value appeared to be relatively 
constant, as shown in Table 5. This supported the 
hypothesis, tested in Experiment 2, that consistency with 
atmosphere, rather than determinancy, determines the 
presence or absence of the interaction between logic and 
belief.
Experiment 2
This experiment was designed to accomplish a number of 
goals. First and foremost, it was to determine whether a 
syllogism's consistency with atmosphere, independent of its 
logical validity and believability, affects the rate of 
acceptance of its conclusion. Experiment 1 found evidence 
of this influence of atmosphere, using inconsistent (non- 
CBoth) IND and DF invalid syllogisms. This experiment was 
to replicate this finding and determine if it extended to 
valid and CBoth IND invalid problems. Second, it was to 
confirm that atmosphere's dual influences, quality and 
quantity, independently affect acceptance rates. Third, it 
was to replicate the finding of a main effect of gender, as 
well as its 3 way interaction with truth value and problem 
type.
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This experiment also tested the hypothesis that the 
logic by belief interaction occurs when valids are compared 
to invalids consistent with atmosphere, CBoth IND problems, 
and disappears when Cql, Cqn, and CNone IND and DF forms 
are used. Recall that this hypothesis was the result of 
noting that determinancy was confounded with consistency in 
the Newstead et al. study (1992). The 5 experiments in 
that study used only IND CBoth and DF Cqn invalid problems. 
Given their method of constructing invalid problems, it was 
impossible to include IND or DF problems of any other type. 
Nevertheless, they concluded that the presence or absence 
of the logic by belief interaction is a function of a 
syllogisms determinancy. It is present with IND forms and 
absent with DF forms. Experiment 2 determined if their 
findings could be generalized to IND Cql, Cqn, and CNone 
and/or DF CNone syllogisms, or if it was consistency with 
atmosphere, which was predictive of the interaction.
Results of Experiment 1 indicated that Cql IND 
problems elicited significantly higher acceptance rates and 
belief bias than other inconsistent (non-CBoth) IND 
problems. Experiment 2 determined whether these Cql 
problems elicited response patterns similar to CBoth IND 
syllogisms. A finding of significantly higher acceptance 
rates for CBoth vs. Cql would confirm the independent 
influence of quantity, whereas no significant difference 
would indicate that consistency with quality alone accounts 
for the higher acceptance rates.
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In addition, a finding of no significant difference in 
belief bias for CBoth vs. Cql IND problems, would indicate 
that the hypothesis predicting the logic by belief 
interaction needed slight modification. It should state 
that valids compared to CBoth or Cql IND problems will 
result in an interaction, while valids compared to CNone or 
Cqn problems, IND or DF, will not. In other words, 
Experiment 2 not only tested the hypothesis that 
consistency, rather than determinancy, was predictive of 
the logic by belief interaction, it clarified whether this 
meant consistency with both quality and quantity, or 
consistency with quality alone.
Finally, Experiment 2 tested one particular prediction 
of mental model theory. The valid CBoth problems in this 
experiment included 2 multiple model and 2 single model 
syllogisms. The valid Cql forms also included 2 multiple 
model syllogisms and 2 single model forms (AAI), which were 
reclassified as multiple model according to Ford (1994) . 
Model theory predicts no belief bias for the single models. 
Subi ects Ninety three undergraduates from Louisiana State 
University, voluntarily participated in this experiment. 
All were enrolled in either an introductory philosophy 
course or introductory course in speech communication. The 
population of these classes represented a range of majors, 
and ethnic and racial backgrounds. There were 51 females 
and 42 males. All were over 18 years of age and had no 
previous instruction in logic.
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As was done for Experiment 1, before beginning the 
experiment, participants were advised of their rights as 
volunteers, and were required to read and sign an informed 
consent agreement.
Materials and Procedure Forty different tasks were used in 
this experiment, 16 valid syllogisms and 24 invalid. 
Whereas Experiment 1 omitted figure 1 syllogisms, this 
study included all 4 figures. There were 4 valids forms of 
CBoth, one of each figure, and 4 valid forms of Cql, one of 
each figure. Each form had a true and false version. 
Ideally, this experiment would have included 4 types of IND 
and 2 types of DF syllogisms. However, to ensure that 
participants maintained their concentration and solved all 
the problems, it was necessary to minimize the number used.
As a result, there had to be a compromise between 
fulfilling the main goals of Experiment 2 and limiting the 
number of syllogisms. As already mentioned, one goal was 
to extend the investigation of the influence of atmosphere 
to include problems representing every figure, of both 
consistent (CBoth) and inconsistent (non-CBoth) valid and 
invalid syllogisms. This required the inclusion of 4 
figures of (true and false) CBoth valid problems, 4 figures 
of (true and false) Cql valid problems, 4 figures of (true 
and false) CBoth IND problems and at least 4 figures of 
(true and false) inconsistent invalids. Experiment 1 
indicated that Cql IND problems should be included in this
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experiment, as they elicited significantly higher 
acceptance rates than either Cqn or CNone invalids. So, 
without counting the Cqn or CNone IND or DF problems to be 
included, the required syllogisms already numbered 32.
The other goal of Experiment 2 was to test the two 
hypotheses for the logic by belief interaction. This 
required including Cqn and/or CNone DF and IND forms. In 
Experiment 1, neither the acceptance rates nor belief bias 
of Cqn DF vs. CNone DF problems differed significantly. 
However, Cqn IND vs. CNone IND acceptance rates did differ 
significantly from each other and from the DF forms. 
Belief bias did not. The decision was made, therefore, to 
include 4 Cqn DF forms (which elicited greater belief bias 
than CNone DF) , and 4 CNone IND forms (which elicited 
greater belief bias than Cqn IND), thus limiting the total 
number of syllogisms to 40. Selecting those particular IND 
and DF types maximized the likelihood that this 
experiment's hypothesis, (predicting a logic by belief 
interaction for Cql problems), would be falsified. Table 6 
summarizes the syllogistic forms used in Experiment 2.
As in Experiment 1, this experiment used content that 
was true or false by definition. Each of the 4 syllogisms 
within a given problem type (one of each figure) used a set 
of terms referring to different classes of animals (e.g. 
reptiles, fish, birds, mammals), with the order balanced 
across categories. Also, as in Experiment 1, both the true
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and false versions of each syllogism had one true premise 
and one false one.
To illustrate, two arguments are shown below:
1. Valid CBoth 2. Invalid (IND) CNone
True False
All animals are salmon Some mammals are rabbits
Some animals are fish All lions are rabbits
Some fish are salmon No lions are mammals
The first is an CBoth valid problem with a true conclusion 
(AII-3); the second is a CNone IND (invalid) problem with a 
false conclusion (IAE-2).
Table 6. Experiment 2: Valid and Invalid Syllogisms Used 
Valid Indeterminate DF
CBoth Cql CBoth Cql CNone Cqn
EIO-1 AAI-1 IAI-1 EEO-1 AEE-1
A00-2 AEO-2 000-2 AAI-2 IAE-2
AII-3 AAI-3 EAE-3 AE0-3 EAA-3
AEE-4 EA0-4 IE0-4 A0E-4 A0A-4
Note. There was a true and false version of each form.
Participants received the 40 problems in random order, 
with each problem on a single page. They were given the
same instructions used in Experiment 1, and were verbally 
instructed to complete all problems in order, without 
reviewing previous answers. As in the first experiment, 
participants were given as much time as necessary to 
complete all the syllogisms. Everyone finished within 45 
minutes.
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Results and Discussion Performance was first assessed 
using mean percentage conclusion acceptance rate as the 
measure. Data were analyzed by a three factor mixed design 
ANOVA, with repeated measures on problem type (six levels) 
and truth value or believability (2 levels). The between 
factor was gender. The assumption of equal variances and 
correlations was confirmed by the SAS analysis (the 
Greenhouse-Geisser-Epsilon and Huynh-Feldt-Epsilon
statistics were non-significant), so the analysis 
proceeded.
The analysis revealed no main effect of gender on 
either acceptance rates or belief bias. The significant 
difference in acceptance rates of males and females for 
invalid problems, detected in Experiment 1, was not 
replicated. This was not totally surprising, as a 
significant difference was found in only a single cell: 
false Cql IND problems.
Table 7 shows the mean percentage of conclusions 
accepted for true and false versions of all syllogisms, 
pooled over gender.
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
problem type F (5,455)=167.38 , pc.OOOl. These results are 
also shown in Figure 4. Multiple t-tests using the 
Bonferroni correction were run to test differences in mean 
acceptance rates among problem types. Results were first 
checked to see if they replicated the robust finding of an 
effect of logical validity. The mean percentage of correct
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responses for valids versus invalids was compared. Given 
that the average acceptance rate of valids vs. invalids was 
70% vs. 37% (pooled over type of consistency and truth 
value), and that accepting the conclusion is logically 
correct for valids, but incorrect for invalids, there was a 
significant difference in correct responses to valid vs. 
invalid problems, 70% vs. 63%; t(92)=3.10, pc.005.







Valid CBoth 83 . 9 75.3 79.6.
Valid Cql 66 .1 53 .2 59.7 
59.3b 
39.0
INDa CBoth 70 . 2 48.4
INDb Cql 49 . 7 28.2
IND CNone 28 . 5 8 .1 18.3
DF Cqn 14.5 4.3
Avg. Valids 75 . 0 64.2 69 . 6
Avg. Invalids 47.1 27.6 37.4
Note. Means with different subscripts differ significantly 
at pc.001 in multiple t-tests using the Bonferroni 
correction.
a One problem, EAE-3, elicited negative belief bias. 
b One problem, AOE-4, elicited negative belief bias.
If participants were failing to reason at all, and 
were only influenced by consistency with atmosphere and 
believability, they would accept the same percentage of 
similar valid and invalid problems. It is obvious, by 
comparing the means of the true versions of CBoth valid vs. 
CBoth invalid syllogisms (84% vs. 70%), or the means of the 
false versions (75% vs. 48%), that logical validity did 
play a role in influencing acceptance rates. In fact,






























Figure 4. Experiment 2. Mean percentage acceptance rates 
for valid and invalid syllogisms, collapsed 
over gender and truth value. n=93.
V V IND IND IND DF
CBoth Cql CBoth Cql CNone Cqn
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participants correctly solved approximately half as many of 
these invalid problems, true and false, as valid problems 
(80% vs. 41%).
A curious finding was that there were more correct 
answers to Cqn DF problems (91%) than to Cql valids (60%) 
or even CBoth valids (80%) . If participants are able to 
ascertain that a conclusion cannot possibly follow from the 
premises, presumably because it contradicts what does 
indeed follow, why are they less able to ascertain what 
does indeed follow?
More interesting, however, was that CBoth valids had 
significantly higher acceptance rates than Cql valids; 80% 
vs. 60%; t. (92) =7.25, p<.00l. Proponents of mental model
theory would probably attribute this to the number of 
mental models that had to be constructed. They would claim 
that valid Cql problems included more multiple model 
forms, which are more difficult, so their conclusions were 
accepted less frequently. In other words, failure to 
accept as many conclusions to Cql valids would ultimately 
be attributed to a problem with logical processing. But, 
assuming Ford's claim is correct, that AAI syllogisms are 
actually single model forms, then this explanation would 
fail, since both valid types included 2 multiple and 2 
single model syllogisms.
This dissertation attributes the difference in 
acceptance rates of valid CBoth vs. valid Cql problems to 
the non-logical influence of atmosphere. Subjects seemed
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more willing to accept conclusions whenever logical 
processing and the consistency bias agreed. When these two 
influences acted in opposite directions, (i.e. when logic 
recommended acceptance of the conclusion, but the 
conclusion was inconsistent with quantity), participants 
made more errors; there was a tendency to be more 
influenced by the non-logical bias and reject the valid 
conclusions.
Responses to invalid forms were analyzed by comparing 
the mean acceptance rates of DF Cqn and IND CBoth, Cql, and 
CNone problems. Results indicated that acceptance rates of 
each invalid problem type differed significantly from every 
other type. This replicated the first experiment's finding 
of an atmosphere effect on invalid problems, and extended 
it to include IND CBoth problems. Similar to the pattern 
found with valid problems, when the influences of logic and 
consistency agreed (CNone IND and Cqn DF problems) there 
were fewer errors. But when the influences conflicted, 
there was the tendency to be more influenced by the non- 
logical bias and incorrectly accept invalid conclusions.
A detailed look at responses indicated CBoth IND 
problems had a significantly higher mean acceptance rate 
than Cql IND forms; 59% vs. 39%; t (92)=7.77, £<.001. This 
IND CBoth mean acceptance rate was also significantly 
higher than CNone IND or Cqn DF problems, 18% and 9% 
respectively; t(92)=13.14, p<.001; and t (92)=17.41, p<.001. 
Cql IND problems had a significantly higher mean acceptance
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rate than CNone IND, t (92)=7.79, £<.001, and CNone IND was 
significantly higher than Cqn DF; t(92)=4.34, £<.001.
Acceptance rates of Cql valid vs. CBoth IND syllogisms were 
not significantly different, 60% vs. 59%.
Results also indicated a main effect of truth value, 
or believability, F(l,91)=59.46, p<.0001. Within each
problem type, true versions of the syllogism were accepted 
more often than false versions, but truth value also 
interacted with problem type, F (5,455) =3.98, £<.005. To
clarify the interaction, as in Experiment 1, significant 
differences in mean percentage belief bias among problem 
types were examined. Results are shown in Figure 5.
If this interaction is accurately explained in terms 
of determinancy, per Newstead et al. (1992), then comparing
any valid syllogism to any IND problem will result in a 
significant difference in their mean percentage belief bias 
(i.e. a logic by belief inceraction). This difference 
should disappear when comparing a valid syllogism to any DF 
problem. The analysis of data from Experiment 2 casts 
doubt on the veracity of this claim. Information from 
Table 7 and Figure 5 were combined in Table 8 to elucidate 
the presence or absence of this interaction.
Before considering the logic by belief interaction, 
comparisons were made of mean belief bias for different 
problem types. No significant differences in belief bias 
were detected between Cql valid vs. CBoth valid problems, 
or among Cqn DF, CBoth IND, Cql IND, and CNone IND























Figure 5. Experiment 2. Mean percentage belief bias 
for valid and invalid syllogisms, 
collapsed over gender. n=93.
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problems. The average mean % belief bias for three IND 
forms was significantly higher than for valid or DF forms, 
which is consistent with the Newstead et al. explanation of 
the logic by belief interaction. However, the finding of 
no significant difference in belief bias for CNone IND 
problems vs. Cqn DF forms is problematic for their 
explanation.
Table 8. Experiment 2: Mean Percentage Conclusions








IND CBoth 70 .2 48.4 21 • 8„ 
21.5b
2 ° - 4 ab
1 0 -3 ab
IND Cql 49.7 28 .2
IND CNone 28 .5 8 .1
DF Cqn 14 .5 4.3
Valid Cql 66 .1 53 .2 12. 9a
IND CBoth 70 .2 48.4 21 • 8a
IND Cql 49 . 7 28.2 2 1 -5a
IND CNone 28 . 5 8.1 2°.4a
DF Cqn 14 . 5 4.3 10. 3a
Note. Mean belief bias for each valid problem type (CBoth 
and Cql) is compared to the mean belief bias for each 
invalid problem type. Any significant difference indicates 
a logic by belief interaction. Means with different
subscripts differ significantly at p<,005 in multiple t- 
tests using the Bonferroni correction.
Table 8 shows significantly greater mean belief bias 
for CBoth IND forms (21.8%) vs. CBoth valid forms (8.6%), 
t (92)=3.49,p < .001, which indicated a logic by belief 
interaction. This was consistent with Newstead et a l . 
(1992). Cql IND forms also elicited significantly greater
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belief bias (21.5%) than CBoth valids, t (92)=3.43, £<.001, 
also indicating a logic by belief interaction. However, 
neither CNone IND (20.4%) nor Cqn DF forms (10.3%) elicited 
significantly different belief bias than CBoth valids, 
indicating no logic by belief interaction with these 
problems. Since the Bonferroni correction is quite 
conservative (it increases the probability of accepting the 
null hypothesis), Bonferroni layering using a stepwise 
correction was used to establish comparisonwise error for 
these problem types. Still, no significant differences in 
belief bias were found. This analysis provided some 
evidence, admittedly not compelling, that while Newstead et 
al. are correct in claiming DF problems do not result in a 
logic by belief interaction, there may be certain IND 
problems which also fail to elicit an interaction.
Recall that Cqn IND problems were not included in this 
experiment, due to attempts to keep the number of tasks 
low. Instead, CNone IND forms were included, which 
elicited greater belief bias than Cqn IND forms in 
Experiment 1. IND problems with a higher mean percentage 
belief bias were more likely to confirm the Newstead et al. 
(1992) hypothesis and falsify the hypothesis tested in this 
experiment, which predicts the absence of a logic by belief 
interaction with invalid syllogisms inconsistent with 
quality (either Cqn or CNone) . Had Cqn IND rather than 
CNone IND problems been used in this experiment, and had 
their belief bias been lower than the 20.4% elicited for
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CNone, as in Experiment 1, more compelling evidence may 
have been found to support this dissertation's explanation 
for the interaction.
Despite the limited support found using CBoth valids, 
comparisons of belief bias for Cql valids v s . IND and DF 
invalids yielded more interesting results. There were no 
significant differences in belief bias, i.e. no evidence of 
a logic by belief interaction, when Cql valids were 
compared to any type of invalid problem, IND or DF. Again, 
when the less conservative stepwise correction was used to 
determine the comparisonwise error rate, the negative 
finding of no significant differences in belief bias was 
confirmed.
It appears that explaining the presence or absence of 
the logic by belief interaction in terms of either 
determinancy or consistency may be an oversimplification. 
When CBoth valids were compared to CBoth and Cql IND 
problems, there was evidence of an interaction. This 
interaction was absent when CNone IND syllogisms were 
compared to CBoth valids. It was also absent with DF 
problems. These findings contradicted Newstead et al. and 
supported this dissertation's hypothesis. It remained 
unclear, however, whether this would be true for Cqn IND 
problems, as they were not included in this experiment.
On the other hand, when Cql valids were compared to 
CBoth and Cql IND problems, there were no significant 
differences in belief bias, i.e. there was no evidence of
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an interaction. Nor was there one with CNone IND or Cqn DF 
forms. This contradicted both Newstead et al. and this 
dissertations hypothesis. In other words, predictions of 
an interaction based solely on whether the invalid problems 
were IND or DF, or consistent or inconsistent with quality, 
were both inaccurate. What seems clear, however, is that 
an adequate explanation of the logic by belief interaction 
will have to address the effect of consistency with 
atmosphere. Apparently, there is a three way interaction 
of logic, belief, and consistency.
As already mentioned, there was an opportunity to test 
one prediction of mental model theory, that single model 
valid syllogisms should elicit no belief bias. Some 
studies have already reported evidence that contradicts 
this claim. Both Oakhill et al. (1989) and Newstead et al.
(1992) have found belief bias effects on single-model 
syllogisms, as well as no effects on multiple model valids. 
Experiment 2 replicated their failure to confirm the 
prediction of mental model theory. Results indicated the 
mean belief bias for single model CBoth valid problems was 
non-significantly higher than for multiple model CBoth 
problems (10.7% vs. 3.6%). Of the Cql valids, the multiple 
models had non-significantly higher belief bias than the 
single models (10.7% vs. 9.5%).
It should be noted that there were 2 "odd" syllogisms 
in this experiment, which elicited negative belief bias. 
One was a CBoth IND problem, EAE-3, with -1% belief bias.
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Excluding it from the analysis would have resulted in a 
mean belief bias for the remaining CBoth IND problems of 
29.3%, compared to the 21.8% reported. The second odd 
problem was a Cql IND problem, AOE-4, which elicited belief 
bias of -.04%. Excluding this problem from the analysis 
would have raised the mean belief bias for Cql IND problems 
to 30.0%, from the 21.5% reported. Excluding both odd 
problems would have better differentiated the mean belief 
bias elicited by CBoth and Cql IND syllogisms 
(approximately 30%) vs. that elicited by CNone IND problems 
(approximately 20%). But even more interesting is the fact 
that had these odd problems been the only IND problems 
investigated in this experiment, no logic by belief 
interaction would have occurred for IND forms. Again, this 
finding would be contrary to both explanations of the logic 
by belief interaction.
Recall there was a similar odd problem in Experiment 
1, a Cql IND, IOE-4, and omitting this problem from the 
analysis also raised the mean belief bias approximately 
10%. There is no reference to anything like this finding 
in the literature, although Oakhill et a l . (1989) and
Newstead et al. (1992) reported negative belief bias for
CBoth multiple-model valid syllogisms. All of the odd 
problems found in Experiments 1 and 2 of this dissertation 
were invalid IND syllogisms consistent with quality, and 
all had a universal negative conclusion. There is no 
explanation for this finding.
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In summary, the results of Experiment 2 are clear. 
The often reported effects of logical validity and 
believability on acceptance rates were replicated. More 
importantly, this experiment replicated the effect of 
atmosphere found in Experiment 1, and extended it to 4 
figures of IND invalid problems, and 4 figures of CBoth 
valid and Cql valid problems. It provided support for the 
hypothesis that the atmosphere effect is the result of dual 
influences: consistency with quality and consistency with
quantity. It also confirmed that DF and IND problems do 
elicit significantly different acceptance rates, although 
it remains unclear whether every type of IND problem will 
elicit significantly higher belief bias than every type of 
DF problem.
Experiment 2 also provided evidence that the logic by 
belief interaction is better characterized as a three way 
interaction between consistency, logic, and belief. The 
logic by belief interaction was present when CBoth valids 
were compared to invalids consistent with quality (CBoth or 
Cql) , and it was absent otherwise (with Cqn DF or CNone 
IND). However, this pattern did not hold with Cql valids.
Regarding the other goals of Experiment 2, it did not 
replicate a main effect of gender, nor did it confirm 
mental model theory's negative prediction of no belief bias 
for single model syllogisms. It did confirm the finding 
that certain syllogisms elicit negative belief bias. If
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the odd responses to these syllogisms are, indeed, 
attributable to their consistency with quality and their 
conclusion statement type, then a complete explanation of 
response patterns may be even more complicated than first 
thought.
Overall, the cumulative impact of these findings ought 
to be an increased awareness of the importance of non-
logical influences on participants solving syllogistic
reasoning problems, which could rattle the underpinnings of 
the currently embraced epistemology.
These results confirmed an influence of consistency
with atmosphere on responses to both valid and invalid
syllogisms. Experiment 3 investigated whether this
influence could be reduced by an instruction manipulation.
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENT 3
Results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that a 
conclusion's consistency with atmosphere, in addition to 
its believability and logical validity, influence 
participants' willingness to accept a conclusion in a 
syllogistic judgment task. Experiment 3 was designed to 
replicate the findings of these two experiments, but its 
primary goal was to investigate the effect an instruction 
manipulation would have on these influences of logic, 
belief, and consistency.
Current theories postulate that participants rely on 
non-logical biases or heuristics, like believability, when 
they fail to engage in logical reasoning. (Logical 
reasoning generally refers to reasoning according to the 
dictates of formal logic.) Therefore, instructions that 
explain how to solve syllogisms using logical principles 
should reduce reliance on these non-logical influences, and 
result in fewer errors. Acceptance rates for valids should 
increase, while acceptance rates for invalids should 
decrease. Unfortunately, only a handful of studies provide 
evidence to support this position.
If, in fact, increased reasoning does decrease belief 
bias, then it should decrease (or eliminate) the 
interaction between logic and belief, as well. And, since 
responding in accordance with atmosphere is also seen as
71
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resulting from a non-logical bias or heuristic, augmented 
instructions should reduce its influence, with a
correspondent reduction in errors. Experiment 2 indicated 
that most errors occurred where consistency and validity 
conflicted, i.e. for Cql valid, CBoth IND, and Cql IND 
problems. Therefore, any instructional effect was
predicted to be most evident for those syllogisms.
To ensure that all types of IND and DF syllogisms were 
investigated in this experiment, it was necessary to limit 
the number of forms included for each problem type to two. 
(This experiment included the IND Cqn and DF CNone forms 
which had been excluded from Experiment 2.) This meant 
there were a total of 32 problems: 2 types of valid
problems, and 6 types of invalid, 4 IND and 2 DF, with a 
true and false version of each form.
Experiment 3
Subi ects. The participants in this study were also 
undergraduates from Louisiana State University. One 
hundred one students, representing a large number of 
college majors, and of varied ethnic and racial 
backgrounds, voluntarily participated. None had any 
previous instruction in logic. Prior to the experiment, 
participants were given a consent form to read and sign. 
The purpose of the study was explained, as well as their 
right to confidentiality and their right to withdraw. 
Materials and Procedure. Thirty-two tasks were used in this 
experiment, 8 valid and 24 invalid. There were two types
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of valids: CBoth and Cql; and 6 types of invalids: IND
CBoth, Cql, Cqn, CNone and DF Cqn and CNone. Each problem 
type consisted of 2 forms, one figure 2 and one figure 3, 
and each form had a true and false version. As before, 
truth value referred to the truth value of the conclusion.
An attempt was made to avoid including "oddball" 
problems, like the IND syllogisms found in Experiments 1 
and 2, which elicited negative belief bias. As a result, 
no CBoth IND or Cql IND type syllogisms having a universal 
negative conclusion were used in Experiment 3. Within 
every valid and IND problem type, each of the two forms had 
a particular statement as a conclusion. One form had an I 
conclusion and the other had an 0.
This decision, to use figure 2 and 3 problems and 
avoid universal conclusions for valid and IND syllogisms in 
this experiment, complicated the selection of DF problems 
to be included. For one thing, such figure 3 CNone DF
syllogisms do not exist. Second, only two figure 2 CNone
DF forms have a particular conclusion, which is an I
statement. As a result, the figure 3 form selected for
this experiment had a universal negative (E) conclusion.
The selection of Cqn DF forms to be used in Experiment 
3 was also constrained. It is logically impossible for a 
Cqn DF syllogism to have a particular conclusion. 
Therefore, both forms had a universal conclusion; one an A 
statement, the other an E. (The reason it is logically 
impossible is derived from the definition of "DF". Recall
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that DF syllogisms are those having conclusions which are 
contradictory to the valid conclusion implied by the 
premises. A statement that is the contradictory of
another must have the opposite quantity and quality of that 
statement. So, a Cqn DF problem, by definition, has a 
conclusion contradictory to a Cql conclusion of a valid 
syllogism. Valids with Cql conclusions are conditionally 
valid, and all have a particular conclusion. Therefore, 
all Cqn DF problems must have a universal conclusion.)
As in the previous two experiments, all versions of 
all syllogisms used content that included terms referring 
to common classifications of the animal kingdom. Table 9 
summarizes the syllogistic forms used in Experiment 3.



















All-2 AAI-2 AIO-2 AAO-2
000-3 EEO-3 001-3 AEI-3
Note. There was a true and false version of each form.
Participants were given a booklet including a page of 
instructions and the 32 problems in random order. Each 
problem was presented on a single page, and participants
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were verbally instructed to work the problems in order 
without reviewing previous answers. There were 2 groups of 
participants. One group was given the same instructions 
used Experiments 1 and 2. The second group was given an 
alternate set of instructions, shown below, which were 
designed to induce logical reasoning. These modified 
instructions clarified the meaning of the phrase 
"necessarily follows". They stressed the conditions under 
which a conclusion can be said to logically follow from 
information provided by other statements (the premises). 
The modifications to the original instructions are shown in 
bold print. Students were allowed as much time as 
necessary to finish all the tasks. All were finished within 
45 minutes.
The following instructions were given:
On each of the following pages, you will find a 
reasoning problem, consisting of two statements and a 
conclusion shown below the statements. Your task is to 
indicate if the conclusion logically follows from the two 
statements, assuming that these statements are, in fact, 
true. Please circle the appropriate word ("YES" or "NO") 
given below the problem. Take your time and be sure that 
you have the right answer before doing so.
To correctly solve each problem, you should first look 
at the two premises and imagine that they are true. Then, 
you should look at the conclusion. If you determine that 
the conclusion would have to be true, given the assumed
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truth of the premises, then that means it does necessarily 
follow, and you should answer "yes". In other words, if it 
is impossible to imagine exceptions to the conclusion, when 
the premises are imagined to be true, then you should 
circle "YES".
On the other hand, if you determine that the 
conclusion might be true, given the assumed truth of the 
premises, but it doesn't have to be true, then the 
conclusion does not necessarily follow. In other words, if 
you can imagine exceptions to the conclusion, when the 
premises are imagined to be true, then you should circle 
"NO" .
To check your understanding of these instructions, 
circle the correct response to the following 2
problems:
1. A dog is a fish 2. A dog is a mammal
ZAZ is a dog ZAZ is a mammal
ZAZ is a fish ZAZ is a dog
YES NO YES NO
Results and Discussion Three participants failed to 
complete the task, so were excluded from the analysis, 
leaving 43 females and 58 males. Performance was assessed 
using mean percentage conclusion acceptance rate as the 
measure. Where noted, the mean percentage correct was the 
measure. The mean percentage correct is the same as the 
acceptance rate for valids, and is equal to 100% minus the 
acceptance rate for invalids. Data were first analyzed by
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a 4 factor mixed design ANOVA, with repeated measures on 
problem type (eight levels) and truth value (2 levels). 
The between factors were gender (2 levels) and instruction 
group (2 levels, standard and augmented). The assumption 
of equal variance and correlations was confirmed, as in the 
previous experiments, so the analysis proceeded as a 
repeated measures one. Results from both sets of 
instructions are shown in Table 10.
This analysis indicated there were no between subject 
effects, i.e. no main effect of gender and no main effect 
of instructions. The absence of a gender effect was not 
unexpected, as none was found in Experiment 2. But the 
absence of an instructional main effect, although not 
totally surprising, was unexpected, despite the fact that 
there is little evidence of it, in the literature. 
Newstead et al. (1992) reported that their augmented
instructions did not significantly affect mean acceptance 
rates of valid syllogisms. In fact, false valids were
accepted more often than true valids. Their augmented 
instructions did, however, lower the mean acceptance rate 
of true (believable) invalid syllogisms from 50% to 17%, 
thereby lessening the logic by belief interaction. The
syllogisms used in their experiment were CBoth valids, EIO-
2, and CBoth IND invalids, IEO-2.
Results from Experiment 3 replicated the findings of 
Newstead et al. (1992). No instructional effect on mean
acceptance rates was found for valid syllogisms, while
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there was a decrease in mean acceptance rates, with the 
augmented instructions, for certain true invalids. As in 
the Newstead et al. study, true CBoth IND invalid mean 
acceptance rates were lowered from 73.5% to 64%. In 
addition, the mean acceptance rates for the false versions 
dropped from 56.9% to 46%. However, this facilitating 
influence of augmented instructions did not generalize to 
other IND or DF invalid problems.
Table 10. Experiment 3: Mean Percentage Conclusions 
Accepted for Each Instruction Group, Pooled Over Gender
STANDARD INSTRUCTIONS (n=51)
Problem Type Truth value Total
True False T&F
Valid CBoth 86 .3 90.2 88 . 5
Valid Cql 69.6 63 .7 66 . 8
IND CBoth 73 .5 56 . 9 65.4
IND Cql 60 . 8 33 .3 47.6
IND Cqn 58.8 40.2 49 . 5
IND CNone 19.6 6.8 13 . 0
DF Cqn 7.8 5 . 9 6 . 7
DF CNone 7 . 8 4 . 9 6.2
Avg. Valids 77 . 6
Avg. Invalid 31. 4
AUGMENTED INSTRUCTIONS (n=50)
Problem Type Truth value Total
True False T&F
Valid CBoth 91.0 85 . 0 87 . 7
Valid Cql 72 . 0 67 . 0 69 . 6
IND Both 64 . 0 46 . 0 54 . 9
IND Cql 61.0 41. 0 51. 5
IND Cqn 64 .0 46 . 0 50 .5
IND CNone 34 . 0 10 . 0 21. 6
DF Cqn 8.0 0 . 0 3 . 9
DF CNone 9.0 2 . 0 5.5
Avg. Valids 78 . 7
Avg. Invalid 31.3
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In many instances, the instructional effect was in the 
opposite direction. For example, true versions of Cqn IND 
problems had a mean acceptance rate of 5 9% with standard 
instructions vs. 64% with augmented instructions. The same 
was true for false versions of Cqn IND problems, with a 40% 
mean acceptance rate with standard instructions vs. 46% 
with the augmented. (Other examples of non-significantly 
higher acceptance rates with the augmented instructions are 
evident in Table 10.)
There was even evidence of the augmented instructions 
resulting in significantly higher mean acceptance rates. 
Subjects solving true CNone IND problems had mean 
acceptance rates of 19.6% with standard instructions vs. 
34% with the augmented. In fact, augmented instructions in 
Experiment 3 failed to significantly improve performance 
on any syllogisms save one. The mean acceptance rate for 
false Cqn DF problems was 5.9% with standard instructions 
vs. 0% with augmented instructions.
Data analysis also indicated that the significant main 
effect of problem type found in Experiments 1 and 2 was 
replicated in this experiment F (7,693)=187.60, pc.OOOl. 
Results were pooled over gender and instruction group and 
multiple t-tests using the Bonferroni correction were run 
to test differences in mean acceptance rates among the 
eight problem types. These results are shown in Table 11.
The effect of logical validity was evident, with valid 
syllogisms having significantly more correct responses than
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invalid syllogisms, 78% vs. 69%, t(100)=3.90, pc.001. The
effect of atmosphere on valid syllogisms was also
replicated. CBoth valids had significantly higher
acceptance rates than Cql valids, 88% vs. 67%, t (100)=6.93, 
p<.001. Furthermore, this difference of 20% between the 
two mean acceptance rates was approximately the same as 
that found in Experiment 2. As before, most errors were 
found where the influences of logic and consistency 
conflicted.
Table 11. Experiment 3: Mean Percentage Conclusions







Valid CBoth 88 . 3 87. 9 88. iA
Valid Cql 70 . 9 65.5 60.2* 
60.2“ 
49. s“
IND CBoth 68 . 9 51.5
IND Cql 60.7 38.3
IND Cqn 61.8 38.4 50 . lg 
17. 2 dIND CNone 26 .2 8.3
DF Cqn 7.8 2 . 9 5.3e
DF CNone 8 . 3 3.4 5 -9e
Avg. Valids 79.6 76 .7 78 .2
Avg. Invalids 38.9 23 . 8 31.3
Note. Means with different subscripts differ significantly 
at pc.001 in multiple t-tests using the Bonferroni 
correction.
This was also true for invalid problems. The CBoth 
IND problems elicited the greatest number of erroneous 
responses, with a 60% mean acceptance rate. Table 11 
indicates, with subscripts, significant differences in mean 
acceptance rates among IND syllogisms. CBoth syllogisms
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had a significantly higher mean acceptance rate than either 
Cql IND forms, 49.5%; £(100)=3.27, £<.005, or CNone IND
forms; 17%, t (100)=12.49,£<.001. They also had
significantly higher acceptance rates than both Cqn DF 
forms; 5%, t (100)=17.42 , £<.001, and CNone DF problems;
6%, t (100) =12.53, £<.001. The CBoth IND vs. Cqn IND mean 
acceptance rates (60% vs. 50.1%) were just shy of 
significance; t (100)=2.96, £<.006. As in Experiment 2,
acceptance rates of Cql valid vs. CBoth IND problems did 
not significantly differ, 68% vs, 60% respectively.
Both Cql IND and Cqn IND forms had significantly 
higher mean acceptance rates (49.5% and 50%) than CNone IND 
problems (17%); t(100)=9.83, £<.001; and t (100)=10.29,
£<.001 respectively. The DF problems did not significantly 
differ.
One disturbing finding was the mean acceptance rates 
for Cql and Cqn IND problems did not differ significantly, 
contrary to Experiment 1. In fact, in that experiment Cqn 
forms elicited significantly lower acceptance rates than 
CNone IND problems, and for that reason were omitted from 
Experiment 2. It is unclear why response rates to this 
problem type differed between experiments. Again, it could 
be due to the fact that all Cqn syllogisms in Experiment 1 
had universal conclusions, while in Experiment 3 all had 
particular conclusions. As already mentioned, if this is 
so, a fully articulated theory explaining response patterns
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to syllogisms may be quite complicated (although, only Cqn 
forms appear to be problematic).
The other interesting finding in Experiment 3, also 
found in Experiment 2, was that there were significantly 
more correct answers to Cqn DF problems (95%) than to Cql 
valid problems (68%); t.(100) =9 .83, pc.001. Likewise, there 
were more correct answers to CNone DF problems (94%) than 
to CBoth valids (88%), although this difference was not 
significant. Again, it is generally held that correctly
solving valid and DF problems requires an understanding of 
necessity. But if participants are able to determine that 
a conclusion necessarily cannot follow (presumable because 
it contradicts what must necessarily follow), it is curious 
that they appear less able to determine what necessarily 
must follow.
Results also indicated a main effect of truth value, 
F (1, 98)=63.85, pc.OOOl. Within each problem type, true 
versions were accepted more often than false versions. 
Truth value was found to interact with problem type, 
F (7,686)=7.72, pc.OOOl, indicating a 3-way interaction of 
logic, consistency, and belief.
The data were next analyzed using mean percentage
belief bias as the dependent measure. Again, no
instructional effect was found, but there was a main effect 
of problem type and a main effect of gender, with no 
interaction. Females exhibited significantly higher belief 
bias than males, F (1,98}=5.67, p<.05. These results
(pooled over instruction group) are shown in Figure 6a.
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Belief bias, pooled over gender and instruction group, is 
shown in Figure 6b.
Differences in belief bias among problem types (pooled 
over gender) were analyzed using multiple t-tests with a 
Bonferroni correction. As before, CBoth and Cql valids 
were compared to all the invalid forms to test the Newstead 
et a l . prediction that IND problems result in a logic by
belief interaction, while DF problems do not. If true,
only IND problems would have significantly different belief 
bias than valid. Also tested, was this dissertation's 
hypothesis that only IND problems consistent with quality 
(CBoth or Cql) will elicit significantly higher belief bias 
than valids. Results of these comparisons are shown in 
Table 12.
Recall that Experiment 2 indicated both explanations 
for the logic by belief interaction were incomplete, 
although it did provide evidence of a three way interaction 
between logic, belief, and consistency.
Experiment 3 revealed no significant difference in 
belief bias for Cql valids vs. CBoth valids (5.4% vs.
0.5%), and no significant differences among IND forms or
between DF forms. Neither were there significant
differences in belief bias for valids vs. DF forms. There 
was a logic by belief interaction when CBoth valids were 
compared to every type of IND problem, which disappeared 
when compared to DF forms. This finding was precisely what 
is predicted by Newstead et al. (1992). But, it was


















•H  10 .0
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-10 0 - 37
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CBoth Cql CBoth Cql Cqn CNone Cqn CNone
Ficrure 6A. Experiment 3. Mean percentage belief bias 
for valid and invalid syllogisms, collapsed 
over instruction group. n=10l.
V V IND IND IND IND DF DF
CBoth Cql CBoth Cql Cqn CNone Cqn CNone
Figure 6B. Experiment 3. Mean percentage belief 
bias for valid and invalid syllogisms, collapsed 
over gender and instruction group. n=101.
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contrary to the predictions of this dissertation's 
hypothesis. Belief bias for CBoth IND was significantly 
higher than for CBoth valids, t (100)=3.27, p<.005; as was 
belief bias for Cql IND, t (100)=4.59, pc.001; for Cqn IND, 
t (100)=4.89, pc.001, and for CNone IND problems,
t (100)=4.30, pc.001.
Table 12. Experiment 3: Mean Percentage Conclusions
Accepted, Belief Bias, and the Logic by Belief Interaction, 
Pooled Over Gender and Instruction Group
True False Belief
Valid CBoth 88.3 87. 9
Bias
° - 5 a





IND Cql 60.7 38.3
IND Cqn 61.8 38.4
IND CNone 26 .2 8.3
DF Cqn 7.8 2.9
DF CNone 8.3 3.4 4 -9 a
Valid Cql 70 . 9 65 .5 5 -4 a b
IND CBoth 68 . 9 51.5 1 7 -4 bc 
22 .4_IND Cql 60 . 7 38.3
IND Cqn 61. 8 38.4 23.4C
IND CNone 26.2 8.3 1I  ' qBC
4 -9a
DF Cqn 7 . 8 2 . 9
DF CNone 8 . 3 3 .4 4 9* ‘ A
Note. Mean belief bias for each valid problem type (CBoth 
and Cql) is compared to the mean belief bias for each 
invalid problem type. Any significant difference indicates 
a logic by belief interaction. Means with different
subscripts differ significantly at pc.005 in multiple t- 
tests using the Bonferroni correction.
The comparisons of belief bias for Cql valids vs. IND 
and DF invalids, again yielded more interesting results. 
There were no significant differences in belief bias (using
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the Bonferroni layering correction), i.e. no logic by 
belief interaction, for these valids vs. any DF problems, 
as predicted by both Newstead et al. and this
dissertation's hypothesis (since DF syllogisms are
inconsistent with quality, nonCql). However, neither was 
there an interaction for CBoth IND nor for CNone IND forms. 
While no interaction with CNone IND forms was consistent 
with this dissertation's hypothesis, the former finding was 
not. Neither finding was consistent with the Newstead et 
a l . explanation.
In addition, results indicated there was a significant 
difference in belief bias for Cql valids vs. Cql IND 
problems, t (100)=3.04, p>.005, and vs. Cqn IND forms,
t(100)=3.27, p>.005. Once again, only the former was
predicted by this dissertation's hypothesis.
These findings conflicted, somewhat, with those of 
Experiment 2, where the logic by belief interaction was 
absent when Cql valids were compared to any IND or DF 
forms. However, Experiment 3 did provide evidence that the 
logic by belief interaction was affected by consistency 
with atmosphere, thus replicating the 3 way interaction of 
logic, belief, and consistency found in Experiment 2.
In summary, Experiment 3 replicated the effect of 
consistency with atmosphere for both valid and invalid 
syllogisms. Contrary to Experiment 1 results, however, Cqn 
IND problems had a mean acceptance rate not significantly 
different than the Cql forms. Apparently consistency with
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quality was not the predictor of significantly higher 
acceptance rates, as hypothesized. Rather, consistency 
with neither quality or quantity appeared to result in 
significantly lower acceptance rates.
Experiment 3 also confirmed that DF and IND problems 
did elicit significantly different acceptance rates and 
belief bias (although CNone IND acceptance rates were 
closer to those of DF forms than to other IND forms). And 
it provided evidence that the logic by belief interaction 
was a function of consistency with atmosphere, i.e. there 
was a logic by belief by consistency (with atmosphere) 
interaction. There was also evidence, in this experiment, 
of gender differences in belief bias; females were more 
affected by believability than males. This is not a 
finding reported in the literature. See Figure 6a.
Finally, this experiment failed to show an 
instructional effect. Researchers who underscore the 
priority of reason have claimed that instructions stressing 
logical analysis will reduce the size of the logic by 
belief interaction. This was not confirmed by Experiment 
3. Not only did it fail to reveal significant differences 
in belief bias between standard and augmented instructions 
for any problem type, it found evidence of non-significant 
differences in the opposite direction. Apparently it takes 
more than providing participants with instructions 
describing proper logical analysis to induce them to 
abandon certain non-logical biases or heuristics.
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The three experiments presented in this paper examined 
the effects of logical validity, believability, consistency 
with atmosphere, and gender on participants1s responses to 
thematic syllogisms. The effects of validity and
believability are robust in the literature, so these 
experiments were expected to replicate them. At the same 
time they tested whether the atmosphere provided by the 
premises of certain syllogisms affected the rate at which 
their conclusions were accepted. As atmosphere is 
comprised of dual components, quality and quantity, the 
experiments determined whether these two influences 
individually affected conclusion acceptance rates and/or 
belief bias. Furthermore, they examined gender effects on 
both acceptance rates and belief bias.
This study was originally conceived to support an 
explanation of response patterns that did not prioritize 
deductive reasoning. Rather, the aim was to offer an 
explanation grounded in an epistemology that gives equal 
weight to reasoning and non-logical influences. While the 
influence of believability on response patterns has been 
well established, it is generally portrayed as incidental 
to that of logical processing. It was hoped that these 
experiments would provide evidence of a second non-logical 
influence, consistency with quality and/or quantity, 
thereby underscoring the importance of such influences on
88
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syllogistic reasoning. Results from each of the 3 
experiments are summarized in Table 13. After a brief 
discussion, there will be an explanation of the major 
results, one which places logical reasoning and non-logical 
biases or heuristics on equal footing.




on mean % acceptance Y Y Y
Effect of Consistency
on mean % acceptance Y Y Y
on mean % belief bias3 N N N
Effect of Determinancy
on mean % acceptance Y Y Y
on mean % belief bias Y/N Y/N Y/N
Effect of Logical Validity
on mean % acceptance Y Y Y
on mean % belief bias Y Y/N Y/N
Effect of Gender
on mean % acceptance Y N N
on mean % belief bias N N Y
Effect of Instructions - - N
Interactions13
problem type*belief Y Y Y
problem type*gender N N N
belief*gender N N Y
problem type*belief*gender Y N N
Note. "Y" and "N" refer to "Yes" the particular effect was
found in a given experiment, or "No" it was not found. 
a This refers to whether consistency with quality and/or 
quantity affected belief bias within, rather than among, 
IND, DF, or valid problem types.
b Recall that problem type is a reference to both logic 
and consistency, e.g. CBoth IND, Cql IND, or Cql Valid.
Experiment 1 used every type of invalid syllogism 
except for CBoth IND forms. That is, it used Cql IND, Cqn 
IND, Cqn DF, CNone IND, and CNone DF syllogisms. This
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experiment replicated the main effects of logical validity 
and believability on mean percentage acceptance rates, but 
its most important finding was the main effect of 
consistency with atmosphere. Atmosphere's influence was 
found to be comprised of two separate influences, quality 
and quantity, and it was the influence of consistency with 
quality that elicited the highest acceptance rates. The 
mean percentage acceptance rates elicited by IND problems 
were all significantly different from each other and were 
significantly higher than for DF problems: Cql IND > CNone 
IND > Cqn IND > D F . Mean percentage acceptance rates for 
DF forms did not significantly differ.
The other noteworthy finding was that IND and DF 
invalid problems did elicit significantly different 
response patterns, so categorizing on the basis of 
determinancy is fruitful. Correct responses (lower
acceptance rates) to DF problems are normally attributed to 
correct logical processing, as their conclusions contradict 
the logically valid inference that can be drawn from the 
premises. Results from Experiment 1 showed that
participants apparently did understand the notion of 
necessity, as they correctly solved these DF forms. Still, 
they failed to consistently reject conclusions to IND 
problems based on this understanding. Furthermore, this 
failure appeared to be mediated by the conclusion's 
consistency with quality and/or quantity. So, while 
current theories can predict the significantly lower
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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acceptance rates of DF vs. IND conclusions, they cannot 
explain the effect of consistency on these acceptance 
rates.
Experiment 1 included one "odd" Cql IND syllogism,
which elicited negative belief bias. Had it been omitted 
from the analysis, the mean percentage belief bias for Cql 
IND problems would have been significantly higher than for 
every other inconsistent IND and DF invalid problem type.
Experiment 1 also found a main effect of gender, with 
females accepting significantly more conclusions to these 
invalid syllogisms than males. While gender did not 
interact with problem type, it did enter into a 3 way 
interaction with believability. This was attributed to the 
fact that females accepted significantly more conclusions
to false Cql IND problems than males. Outside of these
problems, males and females were similarly affected by 
believability, i.e. there was no main effect of gender on 
belief bias in this experiment.
Experiment 2 replicated the main effects of logical
validity and believability, as expected. More importantly, 
it confirmed the effect of consistency on mean percentage 
acceptance rates for IND forms, and extended this finding 
to both valid and invalid problems of all four figures. 
Mean acceptance rates for CBoth valids were significantly 
higher than for Cql valids, and all types of invalid 
problems had significantly different acceptance rates: 
CBoth IND > Cql IND > CNone IND > Cqn DF. Due to efforts
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to minimize the number of syllogisms used, Cqn IND and 
CNone DF problems were omitted from this experiment.
Results of Experiment 2 suggested that consistency's 
influence was additive. That is, conclusions consistent 
with both quality and quantity, had significantly higher 
acceptance rates than conclusions consistent with only a 
single attribute. As Cqn IND problems were omitted from 
this experiment, this prediction had to be tested in the 
third experiment. Results also suggested that whenever the 
influences of logical validity, believability, and 
consistency acted in the same direction, the fewest errors 
occurred. True CBoth valid and false DF problems elicited 
the highest number of correct responses.
Experiment 2 also tested two explanations for the 
logic by belief interaction. The first, made by Newstead 
et al. (1992), was that the logic by belief interaction is
present whenever valids are compared to IND invalid 
problems and absent whenever they are compared to DF 
invalid problems. The second explanation, examined in this 
dissertation, was that the interaction is present when 
valids are compared to syllogisms with conclusions 
consistent with quality (CBoth IND and Cql IND forms) and 
absent when compared to syllogisms with conclusions not 
consistent with quality (Cqn IND or DF, and CNone IND or DF 
forms). Results indicated that both explanations were 
incomplete or incorrect. Predictions of the logic by 
belief interaction based on determinancy or consistency
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alone, were not uniformly confirmed. It was clear, 
however, that the logic by belief interaction was affected 
by consistency. In other words, there was evidence of a 3- 
way interaction of logic, belief, and consistency.
Several other noteworthy results came out of 
Experiment 2. First, it failed to reveal any main effect 
of gender on either acceptance rates or belief bias, a 
finding contrary to that of Experiment 1. Second, two 
additional odd problems were detected, which elicited 
negative belief bias. As in the first experiment, these 
were both problems consistent with quality, that had a 
universal negative conclusion (and E statement). One was a 
CBoth IND form; the other was a Cql IND form. There is no 
such finding reported in the literature. Last, Experiment 
2 failed to confirm a prediction of mental model theory. 
It found belief bias effects for both single model and 
multiple model syllogisms.
Experiment 3 replicated all relevant findings of the 
first 2 experiments: effects of validity, believability,
and consistency. However, it found that Cql IND and Cqn 
IND acceptance rates were not significantly different. 
This was one of the few findings that did not replicate 
across the 3 experiments, although it confirmed the 
assumption that consistency is additive (conclusions 
consistent with both attributes of atmosphere had higher 
acceptance rates than those consistent with a single 
attribute.) The reason why this particular finding varied
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across experiments, is unclear, although it could be 
attributed to the fact that all Cqn syllogisms used in 
Experiment 1 had universal conclusions, while those of
Experiment 3 had particular conclusions. If participants
responses are affected by statement type as well as by 
consistency and believability, this could complicate any 
explanatory theory. Still, it would support this
dissertation's claim that non-logical influences are
underestimated. This influence of statement type should be 
investigated in the future.
Experiment 3 did not find a main effect of gender on 
acceptance rates, but did find females had significantly 
higher mean percentage belief bias than males. Experiment 
1 found a main effect of gender on acceptance rates, but 
not for belief bias; Experiment 2 found no main effect of 
gender on either acceptance rates or belief bias. This was 
the second finding that failed to replicate across
experiments, and, again, it is unclear why. Gender
differences should be further investigated in the future.
The most interesting result from Experiment 3 was the 
failure to find any instructional effect on either
acceptance rates or belief bias. In fact, the augmented 
instructions, which explained how to solve syllogisms using 
logical principles, failed to improve performance on any 
problem type except one. False Cqn DF problem acceptance 
rates decreased from 5.9% to 0%. The effect was expected 
to be most evident for IND syllogisms, as it is there that
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most errors occur. Subjects demonstrated an understanding 
of necessity by successfully solving DF and valid problems, 
but apparently were unsure of how to respond when faced 
with a conclusion which was neither determinately true nor 
determinately false.
It was believed that giving participants instructions 
that focused their attention on the concept of necessity, 
explained it, and provided 2 illustrative examples, would 
be sufficient to improve their performance. It was not. 
Subjects did not easily abandon their beliefs or their 
adherence to the consistency cue. Either their responses 
are the result of automatic biases, or the result of deeply 
entrenched strategies highly resistant to change.
This experiment also tested the two explanations for 
the logic by belief interaction, as did Experiment 2. 
Again, both were falsified by the results. There was, 
however, a replication of a 3 way interaction of logic, 
belief, and consistency.
Collectively, these experiments demonstrate that 
participants who are judging the logical "acceptability" of 
conclusions to thematic syllogisms are influenced by the 
consistency and believability of the conclusions, as well 
as the problems' logical validity. And their judgments, to 
some extent, may reflect an effect of gender, although 
results were inconsistent. No current theories can account 
for the effects of consistency with atmosphere found in 
these experiments, and very few address the issue of gender 
differences.
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In the past, whenever predictions of the so-called 
"atmosphere theory" were confirmed, they were dismissed as 
methodological artifacts. (In spite of the fact that 
results consistent with the theory have been found across 
paradigms.) As Evans et al. (1993) have pointed out, many
researchers, who emphasized logical processing, were 
disturbed that such simple principles could successfully 
predict responses. Critics of atmosphere theory faulted 
it because it could not explain why people responded 
according to its principles.
It is generally held that the influence of 
believability is inversely proportional to that of logical 
validity. This influence, in these experiments, to be 
lowest for both DF syllogisms and valids, and highest for 
IND syllogisms. The influence was relatively constant for 
most IND problems, though lower for CNone IND forms. This 
does seem to support the idea that belief's influence is 
decreased when the influence of logical reasoning is 
increased. The question is then raised as to why the 
influence of logical reasoning is greater when participants 
are solving DF and valid problems.
The answer, already touched on, resembles one given in 
the misinterpreted necessity account to explain belief 
bias. DF problems are those where correct reasoning 
results in an impossible conclusion, one which is falsified 
by the premises (it is 0% probable). Valid syllogisms are
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those where correct reasoning results in an irrefutable 
conclusion, one which is determined by the premises (it is 
100% probable). These two results of reasoning are salient 
to participants, especially when they are asked to make a 
binary decision to accept or reject a conclusion.
Subjects solving thematic syllogisms are believed to 
be simultaneously influenced by logical reasoning, the 
conclusion's consistency with quality and/or quality (which 
is a linguistic cue), and their own beliefs. But in those 
instances where logic determines that a conclusion follows 
with 0% or 100% probability, this influence of logic is 
hypothesized to be more heavily weighted than that of the 
non-logical factors. Conversely, in instances where 
logical reasoning determines that the probability of a 
conclusion's being true is somewhere between these two 
extremes, participants are more likely to rely on and 
weight other influences more heavily.
For example, correct logical processing of IND 
syllogisms fails to result in a definitive answer as to 
whether a conclusion should be accepted or rejected. The 
conclusion is neither impossible nor irrefutable based on 
the premises, but it could possibly be true or even highly 
probable. If participants normally engage in inductive 
rather than deductive reasoning, they would not know from 
their logical processing alone, whether to accept or reject 
such an inference. This would depend on their assessments 
of the probability of the inference being true. In the
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face of this uncertainty, participants would rely on the 
only two sources of information at hand: the linguistic
cues provided by the premises (quality and quantity), and
the believability of the conclusion.
The fact that invalid CBoth IND problems were accepted 
by more than half of all the participants in these 
experiments could be interpreted as supporting the 
hypothesis that participants tend to rely more on 
consistency cues than logic. (Even Cql IND problems were 
accepted by nearly half of all participants, except in 
Experiment 2, where there were odd problems in this group). 
As CNone IND problems, are not consistent with either 
quality or quantity, this linguistic cue indicates the 
conclusion should be rejected. In fact, these problems,
did have lower acceptance rates than any other IND
problems.
It is interesting that more DF problems were solved 
correctly than valid problems. As already mentioned, it 
would seem that in order to correctly infer that a 
conclusion is impossible (presumably because it contradicts 
the valid conclusion) one must first know what that valid 
conclusion is. The fact that there is evidence to the 
contrary implies that something besides logical reasoning 
accounts for this. We are more prone to reject that which 
is impossible (because contradictory evidence exists) than 
we are to accept that which appears to be irrefutable 
(because contradictory evidence is lacking). The reason
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may be attributed to our having experienced numerous 
occasions where contrary evidence is ultimately found.
Despite the clear evidence of atmosphere effects
provided by these experiments, one could still argue that 
they are an artifact of the methodology, that forcing 
participants to make a binary decision to accept or reject 
a conclusion accounts for this pattern of responses. But a 
convincing defense of this position would require more than 
conjecture. One would be obliged to show that the same
syllogisms used in these experiments would elicit a 
different pattern of responses, with no atmosphere effects, 
when presented to participants within a different 
experimental paradigm. Subjects could, for example, be 
asked to select the correct response from a list of five 
responses, or asked to give a probability assessment of 
particular conclusions, or even asked to generate a 
conclusion.
On the other hand, one could argue that the paradigm 
of binary choice, used in this series of experiments, 
closely replicates reasoning in ordinary life situations. 
That is, the normal situation is where we are presented 
with a body of evidence, which we then assess as either 
supporting a particular conclusion or not. Whether the
results reported here are artifacts of the methodology or
representative of everyday reasoning, they should be of 
value to future research.
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In summary, these experiments indicate that 
non-logical factors play an important role in syllogistic 
reasoning, when participants are judging whether to accept 
or reject a conclusion. There may be even more factors 
relevant to response patterns that should be investigated 
further. For example, Johnson-Laird & Byrne (1991) found 
evidence of a bias towards generating a conclusion of the 
same propositional type as one of the premises. The 
experiments in this dissertation revealed that certain Cql 
syllogisms elicited atypical responses. It is unclear 
whether gender may be a relevant factor; further study 
should give a clearer picture of how it is related to
response patterns.
Perhaps the most important implication of these 
collective results is pedagogical: correct deductive
logical reasoning, is not easy to attain or to induce. Nor 
should it necessarily be so. Instructions, that both
explained the concept of logical necessity and included a 
procedure for correctly responding to syllogisms based on 
this concept, were not even marginally effective in 
reducing participants' biases. The reason for this
non-effect may rest on the fact that the principles 
underlying deductive syllogistic reasoning and normal 
(informal) reasoning are quite different in kind.
Correct deductive inference is content independent.
Introductory logic classes typically spend weeks, even 
months, examining different techniques and principles that 
ensure correct syllogistic reasoning. This requires an
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understanding of the logical concepts of validity and 
necessity. Students are trained to focus on the structure 
of an argument, rather than its context, its content, or 
their own prior knowledge. They are taught methods to 
determine whether an argument1s structure ensures the truth 
of its conclusion, when the premises are true.
Normal or everyday human reasoning, on the other hand, 
is semantic by its very nature, as Johnson-Laird and Byrne 
(1991) have pointed out. It is primarily inductive, rather 
than deductive, which means it has little to do with 
necessity, and everything to do with probability. The 
reasoner must assess the likelihood that a conclusion will 
follow from certain premises. Context, content, and prior 
knowledge directly bear on these assessments.
So, when we give participants deductive tasks, we may 
think we are measuring their logical capabilities, as 
reflected in their judgments of deductive validity. But, 
we may be measuring the influence of their biases, as 
participants appear to be accepting or rejecting 
conclusions based on their assessments of inductive 
strength, not logical validity. Perhaps it would be 
prudent to deemphasize the teaching of traditional 
deductive logic and determinations of validity, and 
reemphasize inductive logic like analogical reasoning, 
probability theory, fallacies, or fuzzy logic. This 
approach would be more compatible with how we seem to adapt 
to our environment.
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Whether participants solving syllogistic reasoning 
problems are judging validity or assessing probability, 
the findings presented in this dissertation, of over 250 
participants solving 110 syllogisms, should provoke 
interesting debate among proponents of the major theories 
of reasoning.
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No P are M 
All S are M 
Some S are not P
EAO-3
No M are P 
All M are S 
Some S are not P
AEO-2
All P are M 
No S are M 
Some S are not P
APPENDIX
USED IN EXPERIMENT 1
1. True









P : dogs 
M: animals
2. False
S : poodles 
P : dogs 
M: animals
4. False








All M are P 
All M are S 
Some S are P
7. True
S: animals 
P : dogs 
M: cats
8. False






All P are M 
All S are M 






S : cats 
P : poodles 
M : dogs
AEO-3 IND 11. True 12. False
All M are P S: mammals S: dogs
No M are S P: dogs P: mammals
Some S are not P M: poodles M: poodles
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IOE-4 IND
Some P are M 
Some M are not S 




No P are M 
All S are M 
All S are P
AAE-3 DF
All M are P 
All M are S 
No S are P
AEA-4 DF
All P are M 
No M are S 
All S are P
AAE-2 IND
All P are M 
All S are M 
No S are P
AEA-3 IND
All M are P 
No M are S 
All S are P
EEA-4 IND
No P are M 
No M are S 




All P are M 
No S are M 
Some S are P
13. True




S : poodles 
P : dogs 
M: frogs
15. True
S : dogs 
P : mammals 
M: animals
17. True
S : insects 
P : mammals 
M : dogs
19. True
















S : mammals 
P : dogs 
M: animals
18. False





P : dogs 
M: mammals
22. False











27. True 28. False
S : dogs S : dogs
P: poodles P: cats
M: insects M: insects
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IAE-4 DF
Some P are M 
All M are S 
No S are P
IAE-2 IND
Some P are M 
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No S are P
AAQ-3 IND
All M are P 
All M are S 
Some S are not P
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All P are M 
Some M are not S 
All S are P
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P : dogs 
M: collies
38. False
S : dogs 
P: cats 
M: frogs





No M are P 
Some S are M 
Some S are not P
A00-2
All P are M 
Some S are not M
Some S are not P
All -3
All M are P 
Some M are S
Some S are P
AEE-4
All P are M 
No M are S 




All M are P 
All S are M 
Some S are P
AEO-2
All P are M 
No S are M 
Some S are not P
AAI-3
All M are P 
All M are S 
Some S are P
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3. True 4. False
S: reptiles 















7. True 8. False
S : sparrows 













S : birds 







S : trout 
P : rabbits 
M: fish
12. False
S : sparrows 
P : birds 
M: animals
14. False
S : salmon 
P: mammals 
M: loins
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EAO-4
No P are M 
All M are S 




Some M are P 
All S are M 
Some S are P
000-2
Some P are not M
Some S are not M
Some S are not P
EAE-3
No M are P 
All M are S 
No S are P
IE0-4
Some P are M 
No M are S 




No M are P 
No S are M 
Some S are not P
AAI-2
All P are M 
All S are M 
Some S are P
AEO-3
All M are P 
No M are S 














S : animals 
P : pigeons 
M: birds
21. True
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APE-4
All P are M 
Some M are not S 
No S are P
Invalid
Cqn and CNone (nonCql
AAE-l DF
All M are P 
All S are M 
No S are P
IAE-2 IND
Some P are M 
All S are M 
No S are P
EAA-3 DF
No M are P 
All M are S 
All S are P
AOA-4 IND
All P are M 
Some M are not S 
All S are P
31. True
S: lions 




































S : trout 
P : pigeons 
M: fish
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All P are M 
Some S are not M 
Some S are not P
All-3
All M are P 
Some M are S 




All P are M
No S are M 
Some S are not P
AAI-3
All M are P 
All M are S 




All P are M 
Some S are M 
Some S are P
000-3
Some M are not P 
Some M are not S 
Some S are not P
1. True




S : snakes 





P : sharks 
M: fish
True
S : birds 




P : sharks 
M: trout
11. True
S : snakes 
P : cobras 
M : pythons
2. False




S : iguanas 
















S : pythons 
P : snakes 
M: cobras





All P are M 
All S are M 
Some S are P
EEO-3
No M are P 
No M are S 




All P are M 
Some S are M 
Some S are not P
13. True




S : frogs 
P : robins 
M: birds
17. True
S : snakes 








P : birds 
M: robins
18. False
S : snakes 
P: reptiles 
M : pythons
001-3 19. True 20. False
Some M are not P 
Some M are not S 




P : blue j ays 
M : robins




All P are M 
All S are M 
Some S are not
AEI-3
All M are P 
No M are S 




No P are M 
All S are M 
All S are P
21. True








S : robins 
P : animals 
M: birds
22. False









P : birds 
M: frogs
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AAE-3
All M are P 
All M are S 




All P are M 
No S are M 
Some S are P
AIE-3
All M are P 
Some M are S 


















S : cobras 




P : dogs 
M: collies
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